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RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN COUNTRY JUDGMENTS IN NEW YORK:
THE UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT*
BAuPnAnA KuLZER**
THIS article considers the desirability of enactment by the State of New
York of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act. The first
part is devoted to the necessity for and advisability of codification of the com-
mon law on the recognition of foreign judgments. The second part reviews the
leading judicial pronouncements on foreign (herein, extranational) judgments
in this State. The third and most lengthy part analyzes the provisions of the
Act, compares them with prevailing New York case law, and attempts to
predict the probable effect of enactment. An assessment of the Act's effectiveness
will be offered in the light of parallel codifications in the form of proposed
multilateral treaties and existing legislation in England. The fourth part con-
tains general conclusions and a draft of the Act incorporating the few changes
this paper suggests.
PART I
The Case for Codification
Many commentators have long stressed the need for codification of the
rules relating to the recognition of foreign money judgments in this country.'
Their concern has not been so much with the substantive law now in force in
most of the states2 but with the comprehension-or lack of it-of that law on
the part of foreign countries. The consensus has been that, by and large, Ameri-
can judgments have not fared well overseas, particularly in the vast majority of
This article was prepared as a study for the Judicial Conference of the State of
New York upon recommendation of the Committee to Advise and Consult with the
Judicial conference on the CPLR. It is published in substantially identical form in The
Thirteenth Annual Report of the Judicial Conference 195 (1967) and is republished here
with the permission of the Judical Conference to which acknowledgement is gratefully made.
The author wishes to express her gratitude to the members of the Committee to Advise
and Consult with the Judicial Conference on the CPLR, and especially to the Chairman,
Professor Adolf Homburger, and to all who have commented on the study as it appeared in
the Thirteenth Annual Report. Their suggestions and criticisms have been most helpful and
many of these are referred to in this article. The author is, of course, solely responsible for
its contents.
** Assistant Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law, Camden; B.A. University
of Pennsylvania, 1961; LL.B. Rutgers School of Law, Newark, 1964; LL.M., Columbia
Law School, 1967.
1. See generally Nadelmann, Non-Recognition of American Money Judgments Abroad
and What to Do About It, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 236 (1957). The following authors have stressed
the need for legislation or treaties: Graupner, Some Recent Aspects of the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Western Europe, 12 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 367 (1963)
(in the context of the [British] Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act of 1933,
23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 13); Yntema, The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Anglo-American
Law, 33 Mich. L. Rev. 1129, 1164-65 (1935).
2. But see Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United
States, 9 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 44 (1962); von Mehren & Trautman, Recognition of Foreign
Adjudications; A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1601 (1968).
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countries following the civil law system.3 A significant number of these countries
require a strict degree of reciprocity before according conclusive effect to foreign
judgments. 4 Others do not recognize foreign judgments at all. The growth of
this attitude has been traced to the former French practice of the revision al
fond (review of the merits) which inspired even the United States Supreme
Court to declare a reciprocity requirement in Hilton v. Guyot.0 Although the
case has had some followers among the state courts,7 it has never been con-
sidered binding upon them and New York was the first state to reject definitively
Hilton v. Guyot insofar as it purported to require reciprocity.8 That Hilton has
been laid to rest, probably even for federal courts (at least in diversity cases),
has not, however, been appreciated everywhereY One advantage of codification
would be to dispel any lingering misimpressions abroad as to the vitality of the
case.
New York has a long standing practice of according conclusive effect to
final foreign judgments, subject only to exceptions universally approved, 10 but
her own judgments are not infrequently refused recognition outside of this
country.:" Common law judgments labor under a distinct disadvantage when
invoked in civil law countries. Civil law courts are not accustomed to common
law methods and have been difficult to convince that American courts do indeed
recognize their judgments.' 2 In its Prefatory Note to the Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition Act, the National Conference of Commissioners
emphasizes this state of affairs as a prime motive for its preparation: "Codifica-
3. Nadelmann, supra note 1, at 251.
4. See generally Nadelmann, supra note 1. On reciprocity and foreign judgments see
Lenhoff, Reciprocity and the Law of Foreign Judgments: A Historical-Critical Analysis,
16 La. L. Rev. 465 (1956). Among Common Market countries, Germany requires a sub-
stantial degree of reciprocity. See Nadelmann, supra, at 254-55; Steefel, Enforcement of
Judgments Obtained Under Statutes Typified by the "Long Arm" and "Single Act" Stat-
utes- Germany, Am. Bar Ass'n, Section of Int'l & Comp. L., 1964 Proceedings 239, indicating,
however, that New York judgments might now be granted conclusive effect in Germany.
5. Sweden does not recognize foreign judgments as conclusive except as a result of
a treaty or other special legislation. Ginsburg, Recognition and Enforcement of Forcign
Judgments in Sweden, Am. Bar Ass'n, Section of Int'l & Comp. L., 1964 Proceedings 218.
6. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
7. A. Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 165 (Rev. ed. 1962) lists states that have rejected
and states that still accept the Hilton rule of reciprocity. Massachusetts has recently adopted
the Uniform Foreign Money judgments Recognition Act, adding, however, a reciprocity
requirement.
8. Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381, 152 N.E. 121
(1926). For a recent discussion of reciprocity in the United States, see Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Conflict of Laws § 98, comment e (Proposed Official Draft, 1967).
9. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) requires federal courts
to apply the conflict of laws rule of the states in which they sit. See Nadelmann, supra note
1, at 241.
On the misunderstanding of American law abroad, see Nadelmann, Reprisals Against
American Judgments?, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1184 (1952).
10. Lazier v. Westcott, 26 N.Y. 146, 82 Am. Dec. 404 (1862).
11. See Nadelmann, Non-Recognition of American Money-Judgments Abroad and
What to Do About It, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 236, 254 (1957); Steefel, supra note 4.
12. Nadelmann, supra note 9, at 252. By contrast, it does not appear that New York
treats civil law judgments differently from those originating in common law countries.
2
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tion by a state of its rules on the recognition of money-judgments rendered in a
foreign court will make it more likely that judgments rendered in the state will
be recognized abroad."' 3
That the problem is real and that codification may be an answer is indi-
cated by the experience of other common law countries. Great Britain codified
its law and provided for an abbreviated enforcement procedure by the Foreign
Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act of 1933.14 Canada has been engaged
in a similar endeavor.' 5 The severity of the problem, even among civil law
countries, has inspired several international efforts toward uniformity.' 6
Whether the Uniform Act will achieve the desired international effect
cannot, of course, be predicted with certainty. It is of fairly recent origin and
has been enacted in only six states-California, Illinois, Maryland, Massachu-
setts, Michigan and Oklahoma.17 As yet, no cases in those states have been
reported under its provisions. And no cases have come to light involving the
recognition of their judgments abroad since enactment. Moreover, it must be
recognized that many civil law countries require a treaty with the judgment-
rendering state before recognition can be granted.' 8 Great Britain, aware of the
13. 9B U.L.A. 64 (1966).
14. 23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 13.
15. Commissioners' Prefatory Note, Uniform Foreign Money judgments Recognition
Act, 9B U.L.A. 64, 65 (1966). On Canadian law, see Castel, Jurisdiction and Money Judg-
ments Rendered Abroad. Anglo-American and French Practice Compared, 4 McGill L.J. 152
(1958).
16. The Convention Relating to the jurisdiction of Courts and the Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters prepared by Common Market members under
the directive of Article 220 of the Treaty of Rome was signed by representatives of the
member states on September 27, 1968. It will become effective on the first day of the third
month after the last signatory deposits its instrument of ratification. An English translation
has been published at 2 CCH Comm. Mkt. Rep. f[ 6003. On the various drafts of this treaty
see Hay, The Common Market Preliminary Draft Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Judgments--Some Considerations of Policy and Interpretation, 16 Am. J.
Comp. L. 149 (1968).
Other current proposals include: International Law Ass'n, Model Act Respecting the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Money-Judgments, Report of the Fifty-First
(Tokyo) Conference xxii (1964); The Final Act of the Tenth Session of the Hague Con-
ference of Private International Law, containing the first six articles of a proposed con-
vention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, found in an appendix
to Graveson, The Tenth Session of the Hague Conference of Private International Law, 14
Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 528 (1965). Work has been continuing on the Hague draft. An extra-
ordinary session was convened in April of 1966 for the purpose of reaching agreement on a
draft convention. The work of the session is reported on in Droz, Le recent project de
convention de la Haye sur la reconnaissance et l'xecution des judgments etrangers en ma-
tigre civile et commerciale, 13 Neth. Int'l L. Rev. 225 (1966). The English text of the
Draft Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters as it appears in the Final Act of the Extraordinary Session
is reprinted in 15 Am. J. Comp. L. 362 (1967). Work on this convention has been proceeding,
the principal issue in recent meetings being the relationship between the convention and the
Supplementary Protocol to the convention. This Protocol relates to special cases of jurisdic-
tion. Letter from Ambassador Richard D. Kearney, Dec. 11, 1968.
17. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1713-1713.8; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 77, §§ 121-129 (Smith-Hurd
1966); Md. Ann. Code art. 35, §§ 53-A-53-I (Supp. 1967); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 235,
§ 23A (Supp. 1968); Mich. Comp Laws § 691.1151-59 (1968); Okla. Stat. Ann. ch. 12,
§ 710-718 (Supp. 1967).
18. Among them, Belgium, Sweden, and Spain (to avoid the rule of reciprocity other-
wise applied). See Am. Bar Ass'n, Section of Int'l & Comp. L., Committee on European Law,
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civilian preference for treaties, extends certain of the benefits of its act only to
treaty partners.19
However, codification would be a significant step toward obtaining recog-
nition in those countries without a treaty requirement.20 And to await the
conclusion of a treaty by the United States would hardly seem desirable. Al-
though there is disagreement on the point, the ability of the federal government
to enter a treaty binding upon the several states' treatment of foreign judg-
ments-traditionally a matter reserved to the states-is unsettled.21 On the
other hand, enactment of uniform legislation may provide a good foundation
for future bilateral or multilateral conventions.
22
In preparing the Uniform Act, the Commissioners have taken into account
the British legislation already mentioned as well as a Model Act produced in
1960 by the International Law Association, and the Canadian Commissioners
of Uniformity of Legislation have been kept advised of the American Act's prog-
ress.23 This suggests that other relevant codifications and drafts might be
noted in conjunction with the present study: the partial draft of a multilateral
convention by the Hague Conference on Private International Law, a later
Model Act of the International Law Association,24 and the preliminary draft of
a multilateral convention prepared by the members of the European Economic
Community.25 Because these proposals presumably reflect a consensus on
acceptable criteria for recognition, their provisions, where relevant, will be
contrasted in the notes with the Uniform Act. It may be assumed that to the
extent that these various drafts are in substantial agreement, the Uniform
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act will be likely to have the desired
effect, to the extent possible, abroad. Indeed, it has been emphasized that the
common law is in fact very similar to the provisions on foreign judgments found
1964 Proceedings 207 for a discussion of the laws of these and other countries. On the
Netherlands, see Smit, International Res Judicata in the Netherlands: A Comparative
Analysis, 16 Buffalo L. Rev. 165 (1966).
Countries without a treaty requirement often resort to conventions, a tendency which
has been cited as "the best proof that legislation in the mere domestic field has been
unable to solve the problems inherent in the recognition of foreign judgments." Graupner,
supra note 1, at 368.
19. The act itself merely provides that its benefits may be extended to a foreign
country by Order in Council. 23 & 24 Geo. 5 c.13, § 1. As to non-Commonwealth countries,
treaties have been the rule, but they are probably not necessary if sufficient reciprocity can
be established by other means. Note, The Enforcement of Judgments: A Convention with
Germany, 36 Brit. Yb. Int'l L. 359, 360-61 (1960).
20. See Nadelmann, supra note 1 at 258.
21. For a discussion of constitutional problems with respect to the treaty making
power as it affects the states regarding the unification of private international law, see
Am. Bar Ass'n Special Committee on Unification of Int'l Private Law, Report 39-44 (1961).
On the use of the treaty making power with respect of foreign judgments, see Reese, The
Status in This Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 Colum. L. Rev. 783, 788 (1950).
22. Nadelmann, supra note 1, at 259-62.
23. 9B U.LJA. 64, 65 (1966).
24. See supra note 14.
25. Id.
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in the treaties of most other countries. 26 Codification is a means of alerting
those countries to reality.27
The hoped-for international advantages, then, while uncertain, have a rea-
sonable probability of fulfillment. The increased mobility of persons and the
growth of international commerce seem persuasive reasons why an attempt at
improvement should be made. The question remains whether the Act, or some
modification of it, is desirable in the domestic context.
The Act purports only to codify, not to change, the common law on recog-
nition of foreign judgments. 28 By and large, the area has been one relegated to
judicial development.29 Few states have statutes dealing with the recognition
of foreign judgments, and New York is not one of them.30 But the increasing
number of foreign judgments reaching these shores31 underscores the necessity
for certainty and uniformity.
One additional reason for codification might be urged. The language of
the opinions setting forth the standards for recognition is not always clear or
consistent.3 2 This will appear more particularly when the individual sections of
the Act are examined. But surely codification would go a long way toward cor-
recting this deficiency.
In summary, legislation is suggested because it would notify civil law
countries that foreign judgments are recognized here, and concisely set forth
the prevailing law. Uniform legislation would ease the way for needed treaties
in the area. And it would collect and clarify for our own courts the applicable
standards.
But perhaps codification would have disadvantageous aspects. Perhaps it
would discourage development in the area by checking liberal trends or, con-
versely, open the door to judgments from undesirable tribunals. This seems
unlikely. The Act, by its terms, is non-restrictive. Most of its provisions are
phrased in terms general enough to allow a considerable degree of discretion.
26. Nadelmann, supra note 9, at 256.
27. Other suggestions include a fuller treatment of recognition in official publications
of the United States government and the participation by the United States in international
conferences. Id. at 255, 262-64. Pursuant to the authorization of S.R. 781, N.J. Res. 778,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), official representatives of the United States participated in. the
Tenth Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law. For their report,
see Report of the U.S. Delegation to the Tenth Session of the Hague Conference of Private
International Law, 52 Dep't State Bull. 265 (1965).
28. Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 64 (1966).
29. See H. Smit & A. Miller, International Cooperation in Civil Litigation: A Report
on Practices and Procedures Prevailing in the United States 28-29 (1961). For a review of
legislation either directly or indirectly related to foreign judgments, see Peterson, Res
Judicata and Foreign Country Judgments, 24 Ohio St. LJ. 291, 296-99 (1963).
30. Besides the states which have enacted the Uniform Act, California, Montana and
Oregon have relevant statutes. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1915; Mont. Rev. Codes Ann.
§§ 93-1001-27 (1947); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 43.190 (1953).
Former § 397 of the New York Civil Practice Act had authorized courts to receive
foreign judgments as evidence under § 395 of the Civil Practice Act. Section 4542 of the
CPLR has omitted any reference to probative effect. See 5 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, New
York Civil Practice ff 4542.02 (1966).
31. See Peterson, supra note 29, at 295-96.
32. See, e.g., infra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
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Indeed, it appears to represent a judgment of the draftsmen that it would be




A digest of the policy and law of New York as enunciated in the leading
cases dealing with recognition of foreign money judgments will provide a general
context for examination of the Act and the cases pertinent to its various
provisions.
The historical evolution of the common law has been exhaustively examined
elsewhere 34 and is not pertinent to this study except to afford a brief back-
ground.
Toward the end of the last century, extranational judgments were thought
to be more than evidentiary, but entitled to less effect than full faith and
credit.3 5 Foreign judgments still do not, and probably should not,30 have the
same effect as sister state judgments, but the development of the law with
respect to them has not been unaffected by full faith and credit standards.
87
That trend has been criticized, but the result has been by no means identical
treatment.38 "International comity'--not the Constitution3 9)-has been the
most popular rationale for granting conclusive effect to foreign judgments. This
much-criticized doctrine4" is still cited as the basis for recognition by many
New York decisions, although most commentators regard res judicata as the
only valid reason, both in law and in policy, for the conclusive effect ordinarily
granted.
41
The leading New York case is Dunstan v. Higgins.42 The plaintiff in that
33. Compare 1 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, New York Civil Practice gi 301.10 (1966).
34. See e.g., Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United
States, 9 U.C.LA.L. Rev. 44, 48-56 (1962). Yntema, supra note 1, at 1129-48.
35. Peterson, supra note 29, at 292.
36. This is the view of Professor Smit, which is fully set forth in Smit, supra note
34, at 69. See also the exhaustive analysis of von Mehren & Trautman, Recognition of
Foreign Adjudications: Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1601 (1968).
37. See Reese, supra note 21, at 783. The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws fI 98, comment b (1967) indicates that valid extranational judgments are accorded
the same degree of recognition, in most aspects, as sister state judgments. von Mehren &
Trautman, supra note 36, at 1606-7 criticize this tendency.
38. Smit, supra note 36, at 46.
39. See, e.g., Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N.Y. 371, 375, 130 N.E.2d 902, 903 (1955).
40. See e.g., Smit & Miller, supra note 29, at 32; Reese, supra note 21, at 784; Yntema,
supra note 1, at 1146.
41. See H. Smit & A. Miller, supra note 29, at 32; Reese, supra note 21, at 784-85;
Smit, supra note 36, presents a comprehensive analysis of the doctrine as it should be
applied to extra-national judgments. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 36, take issue
with this approach, on the ground that "treating recognition problems as an aspect of
res judicata tends to lead to a confusion of concepts which should be kept separate,"
especially with respect to a choice of standards, as between the recognizing and rendering
states, on such issues as jurisdiction and the conclusive effect to be accorded judgments. Id.
at 1606.
42. 138 N.Y. 70, 33 N.E. 729 (1893).
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action sued on a judgment recovered against the defendant in England. In hold-
ing the English judgment conclusive, the Court of Appeals said:
It is the settled law of this state that a foreign judgment is con-
clusive upon the merits. It can be impeached only by proof that the
court in which it was rendered had not jurisdiction of the subject-
matter of the action or of the person of the defendant, or that it was
procured by means of fraud. * * * The judgments of the courts of a
sister state are entitled to full faith and credit in the courts of the
other states under the Constitution of the United States, but effect
is given to the judgments of the courts of foreign countries by the
comity of nations which is part of our municipal law. * * * Legal
errors committed upon the trial or during the progress of the cause
may be corrected by appeal or motion to the proper court, but they
furnish no defense to an action upon the judgment itself. * * * So
long as [the defendant] has the benefit of such rules and regulations
as have been adopted or are in use for the ordinary administration
of justice among the citizens or subjects of the country he cannot
complain, and justice is not denied to him. The presumption is that
the rights and liability of the defendant have been determined ac-
cording to the law and procedure of the country where the judgment
was [procured] .43
This statement was quoted with approval in Johnston v. Compagnie Gjn&
rale Transatlantique,44 the case which declined to follow the "magnificent
dictum" 45 which pronounced the reciprocity rule of Hilton v. Guyot.46 The
Johnston case seems to have weakened somewhat the force of "comity" as a basis
for recognition although, as noted, the doctrine remains part of the language
found in current New York opinions. Judge Pound, who wrote the opinion, said:
But the question is one of private rather than public international
law, of private right rather than public relations and our courts will
recognize private rights acquired under foreign laws and the suffi-
ciency of the evidence establishing such rights. A right acquired under
a foreign judgment may be established in this State without reference
to the rules of evidence laid down by the courts of the United States.
Comity is not a rule of law, but it is a rule of "practice, convenience
and expediency. It is something more than mere courtesy ... since it
has a substantial value in securing uniformity of decision, and discour-
aging repeated litigation of the same question." * * * It, therefore,
rests, not on the basis of reciprocity, but rather upon the persuasive-
ness of the foreign judgment.
47
Cowans v. Ticonderoga Pulp & Paper Co.48 could have been taken as re-
jecting comity altogether:
43. Id. at 74-75, 33 N.E. at 730.
44. 242 N.Y. 381, 152 N.E. 121 (1926).
45. Id. at 388, 152 N.E. at 123.
46. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
47. 242 N.Y. at 387, 152 N.E. at 123.
48. 219 App. Div. 120, 219 N.Y.S. 284 (3d Dep't 1927), 246 N.Y. 603, 159 N.E.
669 (1927).
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Of course comity adds nothing to the strength, worth, or, as
Judge Pound calls it, "persuasiveness" of the foreign judgment. The
same persuasiveness is present with or without comity, or with or
without reciprocity... .49
Cowans included in its list of exceptions to recognition, otherwise similar to
Dunstan and Johnston, violation of the public policy of the forum.r o
Dunstan, Johnston and Cowans are the leading cases on money judgments.
Many foreign judgments reaching New York courts dispose of rights in rem,
determine status, award alimony, declare bankruptcy, approve corporate re-
organization, and the like. It seems probable that their numbers far outweigh
money-judgments.51 From time to time in the course of this article, such judg-
ments will be cited as illustrative of some of the propositions found in the
Act for which no equivalent is found in the decisions on money judgments.
Generally the different nature of the case will not affect its authority as to the
narrow proposition for which it is cited. Where it would seem to be otherwise,
this will be noted.
PART III
The Act
The eleven sections of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recogni-
tion Act (hereinafter "the Act") will be individually treated. Each comment will
include an examination of the relevant case law and what effect enactment
would be likely to have on the judicially evolved rules.
§ 1. [Definitions].-As used in this Act:
(1) "foreign state" means any governmental unit other than
the United States, or any state, district, commonwealth, territory,
insular possession thereof, or the Panama Canal Zone, the Trust Ter-
ritory of the Pacific Islands, or the Ryukyu Islands;
(2) "foreign judgment" means any judgment of a foreign state
granting or denying recovery of a sum of money, other than a judg-
ment for taxes, a fine or other penalty, or a judgment for support in
matrimonial or family matters.
Comment. The first section defines the scope of the Act.
Subsection (1) merely limits the applicability of the act to extranational
judgments which do not fall within the full faith and credit clause of the
United States Constitution.52 The Act is nonselective and does not restrict
its provisions to those countries of which this country, as a matter of foreign
policy, approves or with which it maintains diplomatic relations.53 As a general
49. 219 App. Div. at 123-24, 219 N.Y.S. at 288.
50. Id. at 122, 219 N.Y.S. at 286.
51. See Peterson, supra note 29, at 295-96.
52. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1 as implemented by 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1964).
53. Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 9B ULA. 64-65 (1966).
8
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rule, the courts have usually not distinguished among the various countries
or political systems when enforcing judgments or otherwise according them
conclusive effect,5 4 and no New York case has been found making any such
distinction.es Section 4(1) of the Act, however, provides that a foreign judgment
is not conclusive if rendered under a system incompatible with the requirements
of due process of law.5 6
Subsection 2 limits, rather than defines, the word "judgment" as it is
used in the act, so that recourse to existing law is necessary. The Act is re-
stricted to certain "judgments" which grant or deny recovery for a sum of
money to the exclusion of fines, taxes, penalties, or support in matrimonial or
family matters.5 7 Although New York does not enforce foreign fiscal and penal
judgments, it has granted recognition and enforcement to foreign support
decrees.5 s The Act will not prevent continued recognition and enforcement of
judgments not covered by its provisions.5 9
1. Definitions of "judgment" in New York. The CPLR defines "judg-
ment" as "a final or interlocutory judgment."5 0 A "money judgment" is "a
judgment, or any part thereof, for a sum of money or directing the payment of
a sum of money." 6' These definitions, taken together, are considered to permit
enforcement of interlocutory domestic judgments as provided in the CPLR,
6 2
54. Scoles, Interstate and International Distinctions in Conflict of Laws in the
United States, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 1599, 1606 n.32 (1966).
55. It has been suggested, however, "that the difference in the domestic effect of a
judgment under the common law system and under other systems of law in such a matter
as merger may work a corresponding difference in the treatment accorded in New York."
Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 280 (N.Y. Anno. 1935). On the merger rule, see infra
notes 142-57 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 164-70 and accompanying text.
57. Section 11(1) of the British Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal oEnforcement) Act,
of 1933, 23 & 24 Geo. S c.13, specifically defines a judgment as "given or made by a court
in any civil proceedings, or a judgment or order given or made by a court in any criminal
proceedings for the payment of a sum of money in respect of compensation or damages to
an injured party." Section 11(2) excludes matrimonial matters and proceedings in connection
with matrimonial matters, administration of estates, bankruptcy, winding up of companies,
lunacy, or guardianship of infants. Section 1(2) (b) provides that the act applies to foreign
judgments under which is payable a sum of money other than taxes, fines or penalties. All
judgments must come from "superior courts." § 1(2).
The Hague proposal excludes judgments determining status or capacity; questions of
family law; other maintenance obligations; successions; bankruptcy, compositions (includ-
ing decisions relating to acts of the debtor); social insurance, taxes; and penalties. See
Graveson, supra note 16, at 576. Article 1 of the Preliminary Draft of the Common Market
countries contains a similar list of excluded judgments. 2 CCH Comm. Mkt. Rep. if 6003,
if 6005. However, the Model Act of the International Law Association eliminates from its
definition of judgment ("whereby a definite sum of money is payable") only taxes and
penalties. International Law Association, supra note 16 at xviii.
58. See, e.g., Porges v. Louis-Dreyfus, 280 App. Div. 277, 113 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1st Dep't
1952).
59. Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act § 7. The Foreign Judgments
(Reciprocal Enforcement) Act similarly provides that qualifying non-registrable judgments
are nevertheless recognizable. 23 & 24 Geo. 5. c. 13; 8(1).
60. N.Y. CPLR § 105(i)
61. N.Y. CPLR § 105(n). See 1 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, supra note 30, at f111 05.09,
105.14.
62. N.Y. CPLR § 5501; 7 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, supra note 33, at if 5501.03.
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although, for res judicata purposes, a judgment must be final.0 3 Foreign judg-
ments, on the other hand, under existing case law and the Act, qualify for rec-
ognition and enforcement only if they are final. 64
There is nothing in the CPLR or in the Act to inhibit the tendency of the
cases to find that a foreign award qualifies as a "judgment." Especially when
dealing with extranational judgments, a reasonably comprehensive definition
would be difficult because of the variety in the composition and organization of
foreign tribunals. 5 If the Act were to be adopted, the courts would approach
the question whether the award is in the nature of a judgment as before.
Two modern decisions responded to a challenge to the foreign award's
character as a judgment. Both held the award entitled to recognition and en-
forcement. In Coudenhove-Kalergi v. Dieterle,6 the plaintiff sought to enforce
an arbitral award of a tribunal established under German law for the theatrical
profession. The defendant had appealed to an appellate arbitration court and
the judgment against him was affirmed. Both tribunals supported their deci-
sions with comprehensive and illuminating opinions, a fact stressed by the
Special Term in response to defendant's allegation that the award did not con-
stitute a final judgment of a court of record. The court found that the fol-
lowing attributes of the German tribunal satisfied a reasonable definition of a
court: the arbitration courts were permanent and established under German
law; they had seals and clerks and their decisions were recorded and perma-
nently enrolled; the judges were officially appointed with tenure, and were not
appointed by the parties; the presiding justice was qualified for the office of
a judge in a state court; regular sessions were held at fixed terms in public
offices; and registries were maintained for judicial business.
7
A later case, Regierungspraesident Land Nordrhein Westfalen v. Rosen-
thal,68 enforced a revocation award of a German administrative tribunal. The
defendant had applied for and received compensation under a German law al-
lowing reparations to victims of Nazism. The award was later revoked- in ac-
cordance with German law-by the tribunal whose decision, argued the defen-
dant in the New York action, was not a judgment and therefore should not be
enforced. The defendant, who was subject to the tribunal's jurisdiction, had
not exercised his privilege of appeal, so the award was binding in Germany and
63. 7 Weinstein, Kom & Miller, supra note 33, at ff 5011.10.
64. Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act § 2, providing also that the
foreign judgment must be conclusive and enforceable. See infra notes 106-07 and ac-
companying text.
65. New York courts are aware of this variation. See, e.g., Coudenhove-Kalergi v.
Dieterle, 36 N.Y.S.2d 313, 317 (Sup. Ct. 1942) and authorities there cited.
66. 36 N.Y.S.2d 313 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
67. Perhaps the simpler criterion cited with approval by the Special Term, is sufficient:
"If the foreign award is enforceable as a judgment in the country in which it is made,
it will be treated like a judgment of a foreign court, and an action can be brought upon
it as in the case of a foreign judgment." Id. at 316.
68. 17 A.D.2d 145, 232 N.Y.S.2d 963 (1st Dep't 1962).
10
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subject to execution. The appellate division held that where the liability is one
which New York courts would recognize if determined by a foreign court, re-
cognition should not be withheld merely because the final determination is the
product of an administrative agency.
The concept of "judgment" as it had been applied in the recognition and
enforcement of foreign awards, has thus been elastic,69 and would remain so
after adoption of the Act.
2. Restriction to money judgments. The restriction to money judgments
follows the practice of England70 and of treaties both existing and proposed.71
In the area of recognition and enforcement, money judgments are treated as
sui generis. Although the conflict of laws historically provides some justification
for separate treatment,7 2 there are also practical considerations for the limita-
tion of the Act. As noted,7 3 it has been urged that the enactment of uniform
legislation by the states could form a foundation for a treaty between the
United States and other countries to secure recognition and enforcement
4
Most treaties expressly segregate money judgments from other kinds, apparently
because agreement on the applicable standards (difficult as this may have been
69. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 92, Comment a (Proposed
Official Draft, 1967): "As used in the Restatement . . . "judgment" is a general term which
includes not only judgments at law but also the orders, injunctions or decrees or equity
courts, and the judgments of probate courts, admiralty courts and other special courts.
Although a state ordinarily exercises judicial jurisdiction through its courts, in the absence
of constitutional limitation it may do so through its legislature or through its executive
and administrative agencies. The decisions of such bodies, acting judicially, are covered by
the rule of this section." The Reporter's Note lists substantial New York authority for the
use of the term to include quasi-judicial tribunals.
70. British Foreign judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act of 1933, 23 & 24 Geo.
5 c. 13 § 2(b).
71. England's treaties with several non-Commonwealth countries may not go beyond
the scope of the Foreign judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, Id. Graupner, Some
Recent Aspects of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Western
Europe, 12 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 367, 380 (1963). On the scope of the act, see supra note 57.
The proposed multilateral treaties generally cover judgments in civil and commercial
matters; see supra note 16.
72. The original Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 447 (1934) stated that only
money judgments were entitled to extranational enforcement because of the extraordinary
nature of other remedies, although the latter were recognized. The Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws § 102, comment g (Proposed Official Draft, 1967) states: "Existing
authority does not warrant the making of any definite statement as to the enforcement of
decrees that order the doing of other kinds of acts [i.e., other than the payment of
money] or that enjoin the doing of an act. American courts, however, have usually given
the same measure of respect to judgments rendered in foreign nations, which meet the
requirements stated in § 98, comment b, that they give to judgments rendered in sister
states."
In view of the scant authority for the enforcement of injunctions (other than to pay
a sum of money), and since the Act makes provision for enforcement in § 3, there would
seem to be no reason to include judgments other than money judgments within its scope,
although these, like in rem and status judgments, surely fall within the 'underlying policy
of res judicata. See supra note 41, and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 22, and accompanying text.
74. Nadelmann, Non-Recognition of American Money Judgments Abroad and What
to Do About It, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 236, 259-60 (1957).
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in many cases) 75 is easier to reach than in other areas, especially those deter-
mining status.
70
3. Exclusion of money judgments for taxes, fines or other penalties. This
portion of section 1 (2) codifies the long standing rule that "the courts of no
country execute the penal laws of another." 77 Although it is currently uncertain
whether a sister state judgment for a penal claim must be enforced under
the full faith and credit clause7" "a valid money judgment on a penal cause of
action rendered in a foreign nation will not be enforced in the United States."7 0
Generally, however, a judgment must be penal in the private international
law sense in order to be refused enforcement.8 0 The law on which the judgment
is based must award a penalty to the state or to a public officer in its behalf,
or to a member of the public, suing in the interest of the whole community to
redress a public wrong. The purpose must be, not reparation to one aggrieved,
but vindication of the public interest.8 ' This definition was applied in Regie-
rungspraesident Land Nordrhein Westfalen v. Rosenthal8 2 but in language
that would appear to assume that the defense was nearly synonymous to that
of public policy. Rosenthal found the foreign award to be merely a restoration
of what was wrongfully obtained from the state.
In re Neidnig's Estate8s seems to hold that a foreign award of a quasi-
criminal nature-is also not entitled to conclusive effect, but its authority for
that proposition has been questioned.8 4
Sister state tax judgments are both recognized and enforced8s but money
judgments for tax claims coming from foreign countries are not.88 No New
York cases have been found on this point.
-The British act and proposed treaties exclude both tax and penal judg-
ments from their scope.
8 7
4. Exclusion of judgments for support in matrimonial or family matters.
75. See Graupner, Some Recent Aspects of the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments in Western Europe, 12 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 367, 377-78 (1963), emphasiz-
ing the problem of obtaining agreement on jurisdictional standards in both bilateral and
multilateral conventions.
76. See Droz, supra note 16, who indicates that even in a treaty dealing with civil
and commercial matters, the possibility that a question of status may have been decided
by the first court raises difficulties of a serious nature.
77. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 123 (1825).
78. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 120, comment d (Proposed Official
Draft, 1967).
79. Id.
80. A. Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 204-05 (Rev. ed. 1962).
81. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918) (a sister
state judgment was in issue).
82. 17 A.D.2d 145, 232 N.Y.S.2d 963 (1st Dep't 1962).
83. 123 App. Div. 894, 108 N.Y.S. 478 (2d Dep't 1908).
84. On the ground that there seems to have been no judicial determination abroad
of the controverted issue of legitimacy, and since it was not clear that the litigation there
and in the second state was between the same parties, or those in privity with them.
Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 443 (N.Y. Anno. 1935).
85. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of, Laws § 120 (Proposed Official Draft, 1967).
86. Id.
87. See supra note 57.
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If extranational judgments for alimony or support otherwise qualify for
domestic recognition and enforcement, New York courts grant them conclusive
effect. 88 Adoption of the Act would in no way reverse this practice. 89
Foreign support decrees have been the subject of several international
efforts toward uniformity,90 all of which have treated them separately from
money judgments.91 The widely divergent national laws relating to marital
decrees of all kinds-as contrasted to other civil and commercial matters as
to which there is a reasonable degree of similarity-are reason enough for
separate treatment.9
2
It is unclear whether foreign bastardy support judgments are within the
Act's scope. Arguably they are not, either as penal judgments93 or as "family
matters."
5. Other judgments. It is unclear whether judgments relating to dece-
dents' estates are within the scope of the Act. Most codifications exclude them.e4
To the extent that the typical civil law probate decree merely establishes the
party roles for a foreign contest, it is not a money judgment and hence would
not qualify for application of the Act's provisions. 5
Foreign bankruptcy decrees also are typically excluded from the statutes
and treaties on recognition and enforcement in other countries.98 The Act does
not mention them, but it would seem that insofar as a sum of money is awarded
in connection with a bankruptcy proceeding, its effect would be governed by
the Act's provisions, although according to New York case law, the foreign
discharge itself has no extraterritorial effect.97
88. See supra note 59.
89. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
90. A. Ehrenzweig, supra note 80, at 272 n.2.
91. Id. at 272.
92. See generally Droz, Le r6cent project de convention de la Haye sur la recon-
naissance et l'execution des judgments 9trangers en matire civile et commerciale, 13 Neth
Int'l L. Rev. 225 (1966).
93. See supra notes 83-84, and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 57.
95. A. Ehrenzweig, supra note 80,' at 181 n.36. New York law seems settled that in
the case of a civil law domiciliary's death, a local court will forego proceedings and
recognize the heir's capacity by operation of the foreign law. In the case of a New York
domiciliary, it has been said that a competing civil law decree need not be denied recogni-
tion since it typically fails either to vest or declare succession rights. But New York courts
have preferred to deny conclusive effect by either a finding of insufficiency of the foreign
probate or lack of jurisdiction in the foreign court. Id. at 181-82. See, e.g., In re
Paramythiotis' Estate, 15 Misc. 2d 133, 181 N.Y.S.2d 590 (Sur. Ct. 1958) (Greek ex parte
decree denied conclusive effect); In re Lockwood's Will, 147 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sur. Ct. 1955)
(Norwegian probate of will executed by decedent in Norway denied recognition on ground
testatrix was domiciled in New York at time of death).
96. See supra note 57.
97. Compare Phelps v. Boland, 103 N.Y. 406, 9 N.E. 307 (1886) which held that al-
though the foreign discharge has no extraterritorial operation, yet a holder of a bill of
exchange, by proving his claim and accepting a dividend, made himself a party to the pro-
ceedings and became bound by the discharge, with McMillan v. McNeill, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat)
209 (1819) where the creditor did not appear in the foreign proceeding. Cf. Pope v. Heckscher,
152 Misc. 330, 274 N.Y.S.343 (Sup. Ct. 1933), aff'd 242 App. Div. 611, 272 N.Y.S. 1065
(1st Dep't 1934), rev'd 266 N.Y. 114, 194 N.E. 53 (1934), which was an action by a
Canadian trustee in bankruptcy to recover on a Canadian judgment against the defendant
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Conclusion. Only section 1(2) requires comment. The definition of "for-
eign judgment" to mean a judgment "granting or denying recovery of a sum
of money" automatically excludes many of the judgments expressly omitted
from various of the Act's counterparts. Despite its more general language it is
in substantial conformity with the international consensus on the subject mat-
ter of recognition treaties. Thus foreign judgments which, by their nature,
are not aimed at affirmative money relief-such as the typical foreign probate
decree or a declaration of bankruptcy, are not within the Act's scope. On the
other hand, the language of section 1(2) is broad enough to permit inclusion
of judgments related to bankruptcies and successions, for example, if they
do in fact award or deny a sum of money.
The judgments expressly excepted from the Act fall into two categories:
those current case law does not now recognize (tax and penal judgments) and
those it apparently recognizes and enforces (foreign support decrees). How-
ever, the procedural and substantive law relating to the latter, both here and
abroad, differs sufficiently from other kinds of judgments to warrant separate
treatment.
If the Act is adopted in New York, section 1 should remain intact. It re-
flects local law on the subjects covered, and by reason of the savings clause
of section 7 other matters may receive the same treatment as before.
§ 2. [Applicability] .- This Act applies to any foreign judgment
that is final and conclusive and enforceable where rendered even
though an appeal therefrom is pending or it is subject to appeal.
Comment. This section is in accord with general rules of the conflict of
laws,98 the supporting rationale of which is that "A judgment will not be given
greater effect abroad than it enjoys at home." 99 However, no clear statement in
agreement can be found in the New York cases,' 00 one of which has consulted
for the amount unpaid on his stock subscription. Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure
to state a cause of action (based on alleged lack of jurisdiction of the Canadian court) was
ultimately granted. See also Palmarito de Cauto Sugar Co. v. Warner, 225 App. Div, 261,
232 N.Y.S. 569 (1st Dep't 1929).
The recognition of discharges in bankruptcy is discussed in Ebrenzweig, supra note 80,
at 179, and authorities there cited.
98. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 107, comment b (on the finality of
foreign judgments). See also Note, The Finality of Judgments in the Conflict of Laws,
41 Colum. L. Rev. 875, 879 (1941).
99. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 107, comment b. von Mehren &
Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and a Suggested Approach,
81 Harv. L. Rev. 1601 (1968) persuasively argue, however, that there are situations in
which it would be appropriate for a foreign country judgment to be accorded effect greater
than it would receive in the state of rendition. See e.g., id. at 1658-60, 1690-93.
100. Palmarito de Cauto Sugar Co. v. Warner, 225 App. Div. 261, 232 N.Y.S. 569
(1st Dep't 1929) referred to Cuban standards of res judicata in declining conclusive effect
to a Cuban discharge in bankruptcy. The defendant had asserted the judgment as a bar
to a New York action to set aside a fraudulent transfer of stock shares. The Cuban decree
made no mention of the subject of the second suit and would not have been res judicata
if the issue had been asserted there. However, another ground for nonrecognition appears
to have been the judgment's asserted nullity in Cuba for failure to comply with certain
aspects of Cuban law.
FOREIGN JUDGMENT RECOGNITION
private international law standards in determining the finality of a British
judgment, rather than the law of England. 10 ' Section 2 should dispel any un-
certainty as to which law determines finality, conclusiveness and enforceability.
That a judgment possesses these attributes, however, is merely a requisite to
application of the Act. It will have extraterritorial effect only if no disquali-
fying elements are present.
10 2
The rule of this section is related to, but distinct from, the choice of law
in determining the effect to be given a foreign judgment in the second state.
This question is pertinent to Section 3, but may be anticipated here. Having
once decided that the judgment is final, conclusive and enforceable at home,
do the foreign rules of res judicata or those of the forum govern the nature
of its effect? 103 Again, the cases are not clear. One has referred to the foreign
res judicata rules, narrower than those in this country, in refusing the judg-
ment the effect of bar in a local action. 0 4 Others have applied the doctrine of
collateral estoppel to the findings of a foreign court, but it is not clear whether
the rule of estoppel was that of the state of rendition or of the forum. 0 5
These problems will be considered in connection with Section 3, after an exam-
ination of the present section.
1. Finality. It was early settled that if a foreign judgment is not final,
it is not conclusive even as to those issues which were actually adjudged and de-
termined by the foreign court.10 6 Nor, a fortiori, will enforcement be granted
to non-final judgments.'
0 7
2. Conclusiveness. Before it can be granted conclusive effect elsewhere, a
judgment must be conclusive where rendered.'0 8 A judgment may be said to be
101. Ambatielos v. Foundation Co., 203 Misc. 470, 116 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
102. These are set forth in § 4 of the Act, and are generally determined by the law
of the second state. See Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the
United States, 9 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 44, 62 (1962).
103. As to sister state judgments, see generally Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws §§ 94, 95 (Proposed Official Draft, 1967); on foreign country judgments, see id.,
§ 98, comment f.
104. Palmarito de Cauto Sugar Co. v. Warner, supra note 100.
105. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 98, comment f, Reporter's Note
(Proposed Official Draft, 1967).
106. Munn. v. Cook, 55 Hun. 608, 8 N.Y.S. 698 (Sup. Ct. 1890) held that a foreign
interlocutory decree offered as evidence by the plaintiff was not determinative of the issues
decided by it.
107. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 107 (Proposed Official Draft, 1967).
See also A. Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 196 (Rev. ed. 1962). Ty7pically, questions of finality
arise as to judgments in the alternative, interlocutory decrees, judgments upon which execu-
tion has been stayed, judgments as to which the first court retained jurisdiction, and judg-
ments upon which an appeal is pending. A. Ehrenzweig, supra at 196-97 (noting that the
problems which are most important in daily practice occur in foreign support and custody
decrees) ; Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 107, 108, 109, 111 (Proposed
Official Draft, 1967); Note, The Finality of Judgments in the Conflict of Laws, 41 Colum.
L. Rev. 878 (1941); Note, Developments in the Law: Res Judicata, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 835-36
(1952).
108. The British Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act of 1933, 23 & 24
Geo. 5, c. 13, § 1(2)(a), applies to judgments which are "final and conclusive as between
the parties thereto... ." New York cases on conclusiveness include Ambatielos v. Founda-
tion Co., 203 Misc. 470, 116 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (holding that where there are
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conclusive when it is entitled to res judicata effect and is free from collateral
attack.109 It is sometimes added that the foreign judgment must be "on the
merits" of the cause of action.110 The absence of any mention of such a require-
ment in the Act may be a reflection of the fact that a judgment not on the
merits may be conclusive as to what is actually decided.
American courts generally regard as conclusive on the merits default
judgments as to which it, unlike many of its counterparts,"" is also silent. For-
eign default judgments may be recognized in New York although ordinarily
no trial or detailed examination of the merits precedes entry of judgment.112
However, they are subject to a rather more stringent scrutiny than judgments
resulting from a full litigation of the claim. Assuming the jurisdiction of the
foreign court-and this issue provides the most common defense to foreign
default judgments-the judgment will be recognized if the defendant was
properly notified.113 But where 'the judgment ... is a default judgment based
upon personal service of the writ of summons outside of the jurisdiction of the
rendering court it is ipso facto not as persuasive as it might have been were it
two inconsistent judgments, the later in time is conclusive on the effect of the earlier, whether
or not it was litigated, so long as the question could have been raised), and Coudenhove-
Kalergi v. Kieterle, 36 N.Y.S.2d 313 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
109. Res judicata exists in both civil and common law countries, although in a rather
more limited form in the former. Collateral estoppel, on the other hand, has no broad equiva-
lent in the civil law. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 107, at 227-28, 233-34; Note, Developments
in the Law: Res Judicata, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 818, 821 (1952). On collateral attack, see gen-
erally Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 96, 97 (Proposed Official Draft, 1967).
110. "A foreign judgment is not a 'judicial proceeding' for purposes of recognition
either under the Full Faith and Credit Clause or by international comity, if it does not
contain an adjudication of the 'merits'." A. Ehrenzweig, supra note 107, at 222. See also
Restatement of Judgments § 49 (1942). But judgment not on the merits may be recognized
as to issues actually decided. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 110 (Proposed
Official Draft, 1967). The law of the state of rendition determines whether the judgment
affects the cause of action or only some incidental issue. If, under that law, the judgment
was not on the merits and settled only some incidental issue, as that the plaintiff's suit is
barred by the statute of limitations, the judgment is conclusive in other states only as to
the issue decided. Id. at § 95, comment c. Similarly, a nonsuit does not result in a recogniz-
able judgment, unless it was voluntary or with prejudice. A. Ehrenzweig, supra at 222. But
a voluntary nonsuit obtained by fraud or duress will not be recognized. Perkins v. Guaranty
Trust Co., 274 N.Y. 250, 8 N.E.2d 849 (1937).
111. Typically these allow recognition to default judgments if the defendant had
sufficient notice to prepare his defense. See the Model Act of the International Law Ass'n,
Report of the Fifty-First (Tokyo) Conference -Wii, xviii (1964); Graveson, The Tenth
Session of the Hague Conference of Private International Law, 14 Int'l & Comp. L.Q.
528, 577 (1965); The Hague Conference Draft Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. 15 Am. 3. Comp. L. 362
(1967); and Art. 27(2) of the Preliminary Draft Convention of the EEC, 2 CCH Comm.
Mkt. Rep. ffff 6003, 6031.
The Uniform Foreign Money judgments Recognition Act reauires in all cases that
the defendant had sufficient time to prepare a defense. See § 4(b) (1).
112. However, the jurisdiction of the foreign court is subject to close scrutiny. See,
e.g., Plugmay Ltd. v. National Dynamics Corp., 48 Misc. 2d 913, 266 N.Y.S.2d 240 (N.Y.
City Civ. Ct. 1966), rev'd per curiam, 53 Misc. 2d 451, 278 N.Y.S.2d 896 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
Compare Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 98, comment d (Proposed Official
Draft, 1967). On the effect of domestic default judgments, see 5 Weinstein, Korn & Miller,
New York Civil Practice 1 5011.12 (1966).
113. Rhodesian General Finance & Trading Trust Ltd. v. MacQuisten, 170 Misc. 996,
11 N.Y.S.2d 476 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
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rendered after a trial on the merits.""" Although the fact of default is not de-
terminative of persuasiveness, it is a factor to be considered as part of the
broader issue of whether the defendant's contacts with the first forum were
sufficient to satisfy the second court's ideas of due process and its sense of equity
and justice." 5 New York courts have been especially reluctant to issue a sum-
mary judgment for the judgment creditor on a foreign default judgment,
usually because of the necessity of a "full disclosure of the jurisdiction of the
foreign court and of the acts of the parties to the foreign litigation."" 6 But
once the question of jurisdiction has been fully aired, there would seem to be
little question of the conclusive nature of a foreign default judgment assuming
it is otherwise valid under local standards.117
It has long been settled that error of fact or law on the part of the first
court will not affect its judgment's conclusive character so long as it stands
unreversed and not set aside.1 s "Legal errors committed upon the trial or
during the progress of the cause may be corrected by appeal or motion to the
Proper court, but they furnish no defense to an action upon the judgment it-
self."
19
3. Enforceability. Since the Act contemplates that judgments covered
by it will be enforceable in the second state, it requires that they be enforceable
in the first. Thus, if the plaintiff has been enjoined from enforcing his judg-
ment 20 or the statute of limitations for enforcement has expired,' 2 ' or the
judgment for some other reason no longer has continued efficacy where rendered,
it will not be enforced elsewhere.
The phraseology of section 2, however, creates an ambiguity in the Act.
Of itself, it would automatically exclude from the scope of the Act all judg-
ments that are by their nature non-enforceable. Among these are judgments
which give no affirmative relief, as when the plaintiff's complaint is dismissed
and judgment is rendered for the defendant, or judgment is rendered for the
defendant after a trial on the merits. Other kinds of non-enforceable judgments,
such as declaratory judgments and determinations of the parties' interests in
114. Falcon Mfg. (Scarborough) Ltd. v. Ames, 53 Misc. 2d 332, 335; 278 N.Y.S.2d 684,
687 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1967).
115. Id. at 335, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
116. See, e.g., Plugmay Ltd. v. National Dynamics Corp., 53 Misc. 2d 451, 278 N.Y.S.
2d 896 (Sup. Ct. 1967), reversing 48 Misc. 2d 913, 266 N.Y.S.2d 240 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct.
1966).
117. However, collateral estoppel effect should not be given foreign default judgments,
in view of the arguments against collateral estoppel for domestic default judgments. See 5
Weinstein, Korn & Miller, supra note 112, at fI 5011.30; Restatement of Judgments § 68,
comment f (1942).
118. Dunstan v. Higgins, 138 N.Y. 70, 33 N.E. 729 (1893); Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws § 106 (Proposed Official Draft, 1967).
119. Dunstan v. Higgins, 138 N.Y. at 75, 33 N.E. at 730.
120. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 113 (Proposed Official Draft, 1967).
121. Id. at § 118.
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a thing or status, 122 do not award or deny a sum of money and are therefore
excluded by section 1.
This observation may be of scant practical importance because of the
saving clause of section 7 of the Act. However, to the extent that the Act adds
to or modifies New York law, such addition or modification would not neces-
sarily apply to non-enforceable judgments, as when a defendant asserts a foreign
judgment in his favor as a bar.123 Since section 3 provides that a qualifying
judgment is "conclusive between the parties to the extent that it grants or
denies recovery of a sum of money" (emphasis added) it is suggested that
section 2 be amended to remove any ambiguity or inconsistency.
4. Effect of appeal. If a judgment is final, conclusive and, in the appro-
priate case, enforceable, in the first state, a pending appeal or the possibility
of appeal does not affect application of the Act unless, in the state of rendition,
it results in vacating the judgment.124 However, to avoid the incongruity of a
judgment reversed in one state after having been enforced in a second, Section
6 of the Act empowers the second court to stay proceedings.
Conclusion. Section 2 clarifies rather than changes the uncertain case law
on the choice of standards to determine finality and conclusiveness. The sup-
porting rationale is persuasive: there is no reason to grant an extranational
judgment greater effect than it would enjoy at home. To do otherwise would
expose the losing party to perils he had no reason to foresee in the original
litigation.
Because most of the problems regarding default judgments relate to juris-
diction and notice questions, both of which are answered according to domestic
notions of adequate contacts and fairness, 25 there is no reason to provide
specifically for them in the Act. Jurisdiction and notice are dealt with in sec-
tions 4 and 5. On the other hand, in the amendment of this section to be sug-
gested, there is reason to specify that the decision be "on the merits."
It is recommended that section 2 be amended so that there will be no
question that a judgment for the defendant, even though it is not enforceable,
falls within the purview of the Act. An additional impetus to change is the
possibility that a country with a strict reciprocity requirement may receive the
impresson that the Act, as written, does not permit a foreign judgment to be
122. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, Ch. 5, Topic 3, Introductory Note, at
374 (Proposed Official Draft, 1967).
123. Compare the British Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act of 1933,
23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 13 § 8(1) & (2) which provides specifically for the recognition of judg-
ments that do not require payment of a sum of money "as conclusive between the parties
thereto in all proceedings founded on the same cause of action," and such judgments "may
be relied on by way of defense or counter-claim in any such proceedings."
124. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 112, comment b (Proposed
Official Draft, 1967). "The judgments will, however, be recognized to the extent that it
remains a final determination of the issues decided under the local law of the state of
rendition." Id., comment a.
125. Reese, The States in This Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, g0 Colum.
L. Rev. 783, 789-90 (1950).
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used as a bar to subsequent New York proceedings on the same cause. It is
clear that the opposite is true.
26
Section 2 might be amended as follows:
§ 2. [Applicability].--This act applies to any foreign judgment
(1) that is final and conclusive and enforceable where rendered
even though an appeal therefrom is pending or it is subject to appeal;
and (2) that is in favor of the defendant on the merits of the cause
of action and is final and conclusive where rendered, even though an
appeal is pending or it is subject to appeal.
The wording of this proposal, especially the specification that a judgment
for the defendant be on the merits of the cause of action, is influenced by the
Proposed Official Draft of the Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws:
12 7
A judgment [for the defendant] that is not on the merits may
not preclude the maintenance of a further action in the state of ren-
dition itself, as when the original action is dismissed on the ground
that it was brought before the wrong court. If a further action on the
original claim can be brought in the state of rendition, such action
can also be brought in another state.
128
This revision brings section 2 more closely in accord with section 3, which pro-
vides that a qualifying judgment is conclusive between the parties to the ex-
tent that it grants or denies recovery of a sum of money.129 There is no need
to specify that the judgment in proposed section 2 deny a sum of money,
since this is included in the meaning of the word "judgment" under section
1(2).
§ 3. [Recognition and Enforcement] .- Except as provided in
section 4, a foreign judgment meeting the requirement of section 2 is
conclusive between the parties to the extent that it grants or denies re-
covery of a sum of money. The foreign judgment is enforceable in the
same manner as the judgment of a sister state which is entitled to
full faith and credit.1
30
Comment. This section defines and limits the scope of the recognition to
be given foreign judgments under its terms, and makes specific references to
the procedure by which it may be enforced.
As noted, not all judgments that may be recognized can be enforced:
13'
... a judgment is recognized to the extent that it is given the same
effect with respect to the parties, the subject matter of the action and
126. See infra notes 148-49, and accompanying text.
127. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 110 (Proposed Official Draft, 1967).
128. Id., comment b.
129. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
130. Compare Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 98 (Proposed Official Draft,
1967), which is restricted to the immediate parties and judgments rendered after contested
proceedings. Comment f explains this limitation as due to uncertainty whether an American
court will give effect to foreign rules of privity, and to the foreign rules on splitting a cause
of action or collateral estoppel.
131. See supra note 122, and accompanying text.
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the issues involved that it has in the state where it was rendered. Some
judgments, as those for the payment of money, entitle the plaintiff
to affirmative relief. When this relief is granted, the judgment is said
to be enforced.
132
1. Enforcement. The procedural aspects of enforcement are not the con-
cern of this Act, but the importance of some reference to available enforcement
methods in the recognition act should be emphasized here. If the international
effects sought by the drafters are to be maximized, not only is such a reference
necessary, but a more efficient enforcement method should be provided than
currently exists.
Most civil law countries provide an abbreviated procedure, known general-
ly as an exequatur, 1 33 for the enforcement of foreign judgments which does
not involve the reduction of the foreign judgment to a domestic one. Although
its efficacy has been perhaps overrated the common law remedy of a new action
on the judgment has been compared unfavorably to it. 3 4 Great Britain recog-
nized over thirty years ago that "the absence of any provision at common
law for the direct enforcement of foreign judgments makes it very difficult
to secure abroad the enforcement of English judgments, since foreign courts,
which require reciprocity, are not easily assured of the efficacy of the common
law's indirect procedure.' 135 The result was the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal
Enforcement) Act of 1933136 which, among other things, sets up a registration
procedure for enforcement.
The necessity of some reference to an enforcement procedure in the recog-
nition act therefore becomes apparent. Section 3 at least serves notice that
foreign judgments are enforced in the same manner as sister state judgments.
The Commissioners' Note makes it clear that if a state has a summary pro-
cedure, 37 foreign judgments meeting the requirements of the Act would qualify
132. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, Ch. 5, Topic 3, Introductory Note,
at 374 (Proposed Official Draft, 1967). See also Nussbaum, Jurisdiction and Foreign Judg-
ments, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 221, 222-23 (1941); Yntema, The Enforcement of Foreign Judg-
ments in Anglo-American Law, 33 Mich. L. Rev. 1129, 1132 (1935).
133. Exequatur in French law is a writ which, when issued for a foreign judgment,
renders it executory in the same manner as a French judgment. The proceeding is instituted
in a civil tribunal where the plaintiff must allege, inter alia, the jurisdiction and correct
procedure of the foreign court. He must produce an authenticated copy of the judgment,
properly verified by French officials, and, when the judgment is not in French, a translation
under oath. The defendant may deny the allegations or plead affirmatively, and the pro-
ceeding goes forward much like an ordinary action. M. Katz & R. Brewster, Law of Inter-
national Transactions and Relations 442 (1960). Under French law, the exequatur is not
considered a new judgment, but merely a recognition of the validity of the original judg-
ment. G. DeLaume, American French Private International Law 160 (2d ed. 1961).
134. For the contention that common law summary judgment enforcement procedures
provides as easy a method as any found in Europe, see Yntema, supra note 132, at 1136-37.
On the inadequacy of a new action on the foreign judgment, see Lenhoff, Reciprocity:
The Legal Aspect of a Perennial Idea, 49 Nw. U.L. Rev. 619, 752 (1954-55); Yntema,
supra note 132, at 1144; Note, The Enforcement of Judgments: A Convention with Ger-
many, 36 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 359, 360-61 (1960).
135. Note, supra note 134, at 360-61.
136. 23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 13.
137. Uniform Foreign Money-judgments Recognition Act, ff 3, 9B U.L.A. 67 (1966).
The Commissioners contemplate that the method shall be that of the Uniform Enforcement
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for it. However, if the recognition Act is enacted in this state, and an appropriate
enforcement act is also adopted, the effect of codification would probably be
enhanced if some explicit reference to enforcement legislation is incorporated
into its text.
2. Recognition. Extranational judgments that are recognized may have
the effect of res judicata, including collateral estoppel and bar, in the second
state138 but the common law distinguishes them from sister state judgments. 139
The law of the sister state determines what persons are affected by its judg-
ment and what issues are determined, but it can only be said that normally
an American court would apply the foreign rules as to these matters if they
are substantially the same as the rules of the American court.140 "It is also
uncertain what effect would be given by an American court to foreign rules of
res judicata with respect to findings by the court that it had jurisdiction over
the defendant or over a thing or status or that it had competence over the
subject matter of the controversy."'141
A. Merger. One of the more striking differences between extranational
and sister state judgments in American law is the unavailability of the defense
of merger to actions on the foreign cause of action.142 Criticized as an anomaly
and an anachronism, 143 the doctrine of non-merger nevertheless has currency
in New York. 144
In practice, the rule results that the judgment creditor may sue either on
the judgment itself or on the original claim. Although the option may be of
scant importance-even if the suit is on the original cause the judgment is
of Foreign Judgments Act of 1948 in states having enacted it. No reference is made to
the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act of 1964, which provides a registration
procedure.
138. Reese, The Status in This Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 Colum.
L. Rev. 783, 788-89 (1950).
139. Id. at 783 (emphasizes that no such certainty as surrounds the treatment of
sister state judgments attends those of foreign countries). For a criticism of the application
of domestic res judicata standards to foreign judgments, see Smit, International Res Judicata
and Collateral Estoppel in the United States, 9 U.C.LA.L. Rev. 44 (1962).
140. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 98, comment f (Proposed Official
Draft, 1967). Choice of law considerations as they affect problems of recognition are the
subject of detailed analysis in von Mehren & Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudica-
tions: A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1601 (1968). On choice of
law and the extent of the effect of a recognized judgment accorded by the recognizing state
see id. at 1671-95.
141. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 98, comment f (Proposed Official
Draft, 1967). Compare Watts v. Swiss Bank Corp., 24 A.D.2d 849, 264 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1965)
which held that it was error for the lower court to dismiss the defenses alleging a French
judgment as res judicata. The court said that the questions raised with respect to the
ultimate effect of the French judgment to resolve issues in the New York action, depending
upon the jurisdiction of the first court, identity of the parties and issues, and finality of
the foreign judgment, could not be resolved at the pleading stage. It cannot be said that
this is of much help.
142. A. Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 217 (Rev. ed. 1962).
143. See Id. at 218; H. Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 407 (4th ed. 1964); Yntema, supra
note 132, at 1138, 1164. But see A. Nussbaum, Principles of Private International Law 245-46
(1943).
144. Oilcakes & Oilseeds Trading Co. v. Sinason Teichee Inter American Grain Corp.,
8 N.Y.2d 852, 302 N.Y.S.2d 904, 168 N.E.2d 708 (1960).
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normally conclusive upon the issues involved14 5 -in some situations it may
be to the plaintiff's advantage to sue on his cause of action rather than upon
a questionable judgment.
146
Adoption of the Act may change this aspect of New York law:
... once statute or treaty law has secured enforcement of foreign
judgments, a revision of the merger rule will become imperative. Then
it will be justified to ask: "If the foreign judgment is conclusive upon
the merits against the defendant, why is it not equally so against
the plaintiff?
147
B. Bar. New York case law is clear that an extranational judgment en-
titled to recognition will have the effect of bar to the same extent as judgments
of sister states,148 but has not settled whether New York rules or some other
rules of res judicata are applied. 149
C. Collateral estoppel. The "first authoritative international conflicts
case on collateral estoppel"' 50 came not from New York, but Delaware. The
supreme court of that state rejected the view of the lower court that collateral
estoppel effect is a matter of the court's discretion. Rather, such effect should
be given in an appropriate case. But since the issue before it could probably
have been relitigated in the Netherlands, the state of origin, it did not present
the "appropriate case."' 151 If the reference is to the foreign law the result will be,
it has been submitted, a denial of collateral estoppel effect to virtually all judg-
ments coming from civil law countries'5 2 most of which lack a concept closely
corresponding to the American doctrine. 153
D. Effect of section 3. Section 3 limits the effect of a foreign judgment; it is
conclusive only between the parties, and only to the extent that it grants or
denies a sum of money. No attempt was made by the drafters to clarify the
difficult conflict of laws questions involved'5 4 which seems to reflect a decision
145. Reese, supra note 138, at 788.
146. A. Ehrenzweig, supra note 142, at 218.
147. Id.
148. Johnston v. Compagnie G&n~rale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381, 152 N.E. 121
(1926); In re Rutherford's Estate, 182 Misc. 1019, 46 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sur. Ct. 1944). See
A. Ehrenzweig, supra note 142, at 217; Yntema, supra note 132, at 1139-40.
149. See, e.g., Frenkel & Co. Inc. v. L'Urbaine Fire Ins. Co. of Paris, France, 225 App.
Div. 332, 233 N.Y.S. 206 (1st Dept. 1929), modified on other grounds, 251 N.Y. 243, 167
N.E. 430 (1929); In re Rutherford's Estate, 182 Misc. 1019, 46 N.Y.S. 2d 871 (Sur. Ct. 1944).
150. A. Ehrenzweig, supra note 142, at 234.
151. Batav. Bata, 39 Del. Ch. 258, 163 A.2d 493 (1960), cert. den. 366 U.S. 964 (1961).
For discussions of the case, see A. Ehrenzweig, supra note 142, at 234; Smit, International
Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States, 9 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 44, 72-73
(1962); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 98, comment f, Reporter's Note
(Proposed Official Draft, 1967).
152. A. Ehrenzweig, supra note 142, at 234.
153. Id. at 227-28, 234. See also Note, Developments in the Law: Res Judicata, 65
Harv. L. Rev. 818, 821 (1952).
154. The section dealing with foreign country judgments presented "perhaps the
greatest difficulty" in preparation of the Restatement. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws xvii (Proposed Official Draft, 1967). von Mebren & Trautman, supra note 140 at
1680 n. 274, regard § 3 of the Act as leaving open the question whether preclusive effects
broader than the holding will be granted.
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that would be desirable to permit the courts to develop concepts without the
restrictions of statutory language.
The section reflects, in its silence on the conflicts question, the uncertainty
noted also by the Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws.155 Although
the word "recognition" implies that a judgment is given the same effect as it
would have in the state of rendition, American courts have not committed
themselves to application of foreign res judicata rules.156 The Act does not
require such a development.
157
Two aspects of the res judicata, however, may be influenced by codifica-
tion: merger and collateral estoppel. The possible effect in the non-merger
rule as it is applied to extranational judgments has been noted.' 55 With re-
spect to collateral estoppel, the section seems open to the interpretation that
only that total portion of a judgment which awards or denies a sum of money
is entitled to conclusive effect in subsequent proceedings on a different cause,
to the exclusion of single adjudicated issues.' 59 By contrast, domestic collateral
estoppel results in conclusive effect for essential matters actually litigated and
determined.' 60
Conclusion. If the Act is adopted, the substance of section 3 should not
be changed. It reflects existing law which, however uncertain, seems to be
in the process of development. An attempt to formulate generally valid direc-
tives as to the proper choice of law would be complicated and far beyond the
limited purposes of the Act.
It could be argued that section 3 does require application of domestic rules
155. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, § 98, comment f. Cf. Smit, Inter-
national Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States, 9 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 44,
62 (1962):
While domestic law . . . is generally applied to determine whether any . . .
disqualifying elements are present, resort is ordinarily made to the law of res
judicata of the foreign forum in determining what effect the foreign judgment will
actually have. Once a foreign judgment is recognized, it will be given the same
effect in subsequent domestic proceedings that it would have in subsequent pro-
ceedings in the foreign forum.
156. "It is uncertain ... whether an American court will always give [the same degree
of recognition as to a sister state judgment] to the foreign rules of privity . . . and to the
foreign rules as to splitting a cause of action or as to collateral estoppel. . . .Normally,
an American court would apply the foreign rules as to these matters if these rules are
substantially the same as the rules of the American court." Restatement (Second) of Con-
flict of Laws § 98, comment f (Proposed Official Draft, 1967).
157. Professor Smit has characterized application of foreign res judicata rules as
idiosyncratic. Smit, supra note 155 at 62. Professor Smit argues that domestic res judicata
principles should not be transplanted to the international field because relitigation would
not, in such cases, be a mere duplication of the original action, and the policy of fairness
to the litigants would not necessarily be violated. Cf. Peterson, Res Judicata and Foreign
Judgments, 24 Ohio St. L.J. 291 (1963), who differs with Professor Smit on some points.
158. See supra notes 142-47, and accompanying text.
159. See Smit, supra note 155, at 71-74. The following New York cases support the
proposition that collateral estoppel effect should be given to foreign judgments: In Re Zeitz
Estates, 207 Misc. 22, 135 N.Y.S.2d 573 (Sur. Ct. 1954), aff'd mem., 285 App. Div. 1147,
143 N.Y.S.2d 602 (1st Dep't 1955); Newton v. Hunt, 59 Misc. 633, 112 N.Y.S. 573 (Sup.
Ct. 1908), modified on other grounds, 134 App. Div. 335, 119 N.Y.S. 3 (1st Dep't 1909);
aff'd inem., 201 N.Y. 599, 95 N.E. 1139 (1911).
160. See generally Restatement of judgments §§ 45, 68-71 (1942).
23
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of res judicata. Where the drafters intended that foreign law be consulted (in
accordance with existing case law) this was clearly indicated in section 2.
However, the better view would seem to be that section 3 merely expresses in
statutory form language customarily used in the cases.
The possibility of a change in the non-merger rule has been noted. The
suggestion is that this would be an inevitable result of any treaty or statute
requiring recognition in appropriate cases. In any event, there is little justifi-
cation for its retention.
The Act may influence collateral estoppel effects of foreign judgments.
Present law is vague, and perhaps complicated by the lack of an equivalent
doctrine in most other countries. It has been suggested that collateral estoppel
effect should not be granted to essential litigated matters but only, and under
limited circumstances, to the entire foreign judgment. 161
The only suggested change is incorporation (into section 3) of a reference
to a summary enforcement procedure if one should become available to foreign
judgments in New York. This could read:
Except as provided in section 4, a foreign judgment meeting the
requirements of section 2 is conclusive between the parties to the ex-
tent that it grants or denies recovery of a sum of money. The fbreign
judgment is enforceable in the same manner as the judgment of a sister
state which is entitled to full faith and credit. The enforcement proce-
dure provided by [name of act, or citation] is available to a qualifying
foreign judgment.
162
§ 4. [Grounds for Non-recognition].-(a) A foreign judgment
is not conclusive if
(1) the judgment was rendered under a system which does not
provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the
requirements of due process of law;
161. Smit, supra note 155, at 71-74. Cf. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 140,
at 1680.
162. The Commissioners evidently do not anticipate that a registration procedure
will be made available to foreign judgments, notwithstanding that one is provided by the
Uniform Enforcement of Foreign judgments Act of 1964. See 9B U.L.A. 67 (1966).
Objection has been made to the suggestion that a registration procedure be made
available to foreign judgments, especially if such a procedure should take the form of the
Uniform Foreign judgments Enforcement Act (Revised 1964 Act), principally on the
ground that registration need not be preceded or accompanied by a judicial determination
of the judgment's Validity under foreign or domestic standards. However, the judgment
debtor is notified of the registration and may contest and defeat registration. Unless the
judgment creditor is acting against his own self interest or is engaging in harrassing tech-
niques, he will not seek registration in a place where the debtor is neither present nor has
substantial assets. Thus, in a normal case, it would seem that no undue burden would be
placed on a judgment debtor. But concedediy, the varying procedural and substantive
systems that produce foreign country judgments reaching these shores may demand separate
treatment for enforcement.
Quite apart from this, however, the necessity for some quicker, cheaper method of
judgment enforcement than currently exists seems evident, perhaps one tailored specifically
to the special problems posed by foreign country judgments. Moreover, some explicit
reference to such a procedure ought to enhance the recognitions act's effects abroad,
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(2) the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the
defendant; or
(3) the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
(b) A foreign judgment need not be recognized if
(1) the defendant in the proceeding in the foreign court did not
receive notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable
him to defend;
(2) the judgment was obtained by fraud;
(3) the [cause of action] [claim for relief] on which the judg-
ment is based is repugnant to the public policy of this state;
(4) the judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive
judgment;
(5) the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agree-
ment between the parties under which the dispute in question
was to be settled otherwise than by proceedings in that court;
or
(6) in the case of jurisdiction based solely on personal service,
the foreign court was a seriously inconvenient forum for the
trial of the action.
Comment. This section sets forth the circumstances under which section
3 will not or need not apply. Subsection (a) goes to the validity of the judg-
ment itself.163 Subsection (b) is concerned with the interests of the parties
and of the second state.
1. Situations in which a judgment is not conclusive.
A. Unacceptability of foreign procedure. Hilton v. Guyotl 4 provides the
authority for the requirements of section 4 (a) (1).165 Hilton also indicated that a
mere difference in procedural systems is not a sufficient basis for denial of rec-
ognition.' 0 6 A case of serious injustice must be involved. New York authority
is in accord.' 0 7 The subsection has its counterpart in the defense of "violation
163. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 92 (Proposed Official Draft,
1967).
164. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
165. A foreign nation judgment will not be recognized unless the American court is
convinced that:
[T]here has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before a court of
competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular proceedings, after due
citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant, and under a system of juris-
prudence likely to secure an impartial administraon of justice between the citizens
of its own country and those of other countries, and there is nothing to show
either prejudice in the court, or in the system of laws under which it is sitting,
or fraud in procuring the judgment, or any other special reason why the comity of
this nation should not allow it full effect ...
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202 (1895).
166. Id. at 205.
167. See Dunstan v. Higgins, 138 N.Y. 70, 33 N.E. 729 (1893) which held that so
long as the defendant has had the benefit of such rules and regulations as have been
adopted, or are in use for the ordinary administration of justice among the citizens or sub-
jects of a country, he cannot complain. The presumption is that the rights and liability of
the defendant have been determined according to the law and procedure of the country
where the judgment is rendered, when there is nothing in the record to the contrary.
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of natural justice" found in international proposals, some of which include a
"due process" provision.168
The suggestion has been made that if an American court were to recog-
nize a judgment rooted in a violation of due process, the recognizing court might
be acting unconstitutionally under domestic law. 169 However, there is agreement
that a strict application of domestic due process standards is uncalled for.170
B. The foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defen-
dant. The foreign court's lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant is
probably the most frequent defense alleged when a judgment is offered as con-
clusive in another state. No country's courts will recognize a judgment founded
on claim of jurisdiction unacceptable by its own standards.' 7' However, a court
often refuses to recognize a judgment even where its own laws would have
permitted it to take jurisdiction under the circumstances. 72 Otherwise, a foreign
court could "rule the world" which, of course, no other country would permit. 7 3
168. For discussions of "natural justice" see H. Smit & A. Miller, International Co-
operation in Civil Litigation: A Report on Practices and Procedures Prevailing in the
United States 33 (1961); Reese, The Status in This Country of Judgments Rendered
Abroad, 50 Colum. L. Rev. 783, 795 (1950). Natural justice is said to be violated if the
proceedings departed rather flagrantly from accepted notions of fairness. Id.
The International Law Association Model Act, § 4(c), provides that recognition is to
be denied if natural justice (i.e., the judgment "was not rendered by an impartial tribunal
or under a procedural system compatible with the requirements of due process of law") is
violated. International Law Ass'n, Report of the Fifty-First (Tokyo) Conference xvii, xix
(1964). The Final Act of the tenth session of the Hague Conference contains a provision
according to which signatories may reserve the right not to recognize judgments rendered
in a proceeding in which the requirements of natural justice, or due process of law, were
not satisfied. No such requirement had ever appeared in bilateral treaties. Report of the
U.S. Delegation to the Tenth Session of the Hague Conference on Private International
Law, 52 Dep't State Bull. 265, 271-72 (1965).
169. Reese, supra note 168, at 796, n.66; Smit, supra note 155, at 46-47. Such an argu-
ment was apparently raised and accepted in Falcon Mfg. (Scarborough) Ltd. v. Ames, 53
Misc. 2d 332, 278 N.Y.S.2d 684 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1967).
170. H. Smit & A. Miller, supra note 168, at 33; Reese, supra note 168, at 795, 796.
171. Nussbaum, Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 221, 223
(1941). The term generally used to describe the power in the first state recognized by the
second state (but not, of course, conferred by it) is indirect jurisdiction denoting "judicial
authority as determined under the law of the state in which application is made" for
recognition of a judgment rather than for initial adjudication of a claim. Ginsburg, The
Competent Court in Private International Law: Some Observations on Current Views in
the United States, 20 Rutgers L. Rev. 89, 93 n.18 (1965). See generally Smit, The Terms
Jurisdiction and Competence in Comparative Law, 10 Am. J. Comp. L. 164 (1961).
That a strict equivalence principle is undesirable, especially where it would require
denial of recognition unless the requested forum itself employs a jurisdictional basis equiva-
lent to that employed by the rendering court, see von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 140,
at 1616-18. Rather, choice of law principles ought to be applied to determine if a sub-
stantial basis for recognition exists. Id. at 1619-20, citing English and American cases
utilizing such an approach.
172. Graupner, Some Recent Aspects of the Recognition and Enforcement of Forcign
Judgments in Western Europe, 12 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 367, 372-73 (1963); Nussbaum, supra
note 171, at 223-24; Reese, supra note 168, at 786.
173. Buchanan v. Rucker, [18081 9 East. 192, 103 Eng. Rep. 546; Schisbsby v. Westen-
helz, [18701 L.R. 6 Q.B. 155 (holding that a French judgment against a non-resident
obtained after extraterritorial service on the defendant, valid under French law, is not
recognizable even though English law gave English courts jurisdiction over non-residents
under substantially the same theory. The court noted that a United States court would
not recognize such an English judgment: ". . . a further question would be open, viz,
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The findings of the foreign court as to its jurisdiction are therefore not bind-
ing on the second court.
174
Section 5 of the Act describes acceptable bases of personal jurisdiction, at
which point New York authority will be discussed.
C. The foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter.175
This subsection reflects the pronouncements of leading New York decisions. 176
At least one New York case has examined the subject matter jurisdiction of a
foreign court and found it lacking.177 It is generally presumed, however, that the
foreign court was competent to deal with the cause unless proof to the contrary
is offered. 178 If the issue is raised and the second court finds the first was in-
competent, conclusive effect will be denied.'
79
Section 4(a) (3) taken in conjunction with section 2 leads to the conclusion
that even though a judgment is final, conclusive and enforceable in the first
state, and not subject to collateral attack for want of competence, it may not
be recognized if in fact the court was incompetent. This conclusion follows be-
not only whether the British legislature had given the English courts jurisdiction over the
defendant, but whether he was under any obligation which the American courts could
recognize to submit to the jurisdiction thus created.").
174. Nussbaum, supra note 171, at 224.
175. Much critical attention has been devoted to the terms "jurisdiction" and
"competence". "Competence'-at least in a comparative law context-describes what is
generally known as "subject matter jurisdiction" although it may have other meanings as
well. See generally Smit, The Terms Jurisdiction and Competence in Comparative Law,
10 Am. J. Comp. L. 164 (1961). The distinction seems to have been accepted in the literature.
See, e.g., 1 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, New York Civil Practice ff 301.02 (1966); 4, id. at
flj 3211.10-3211.17; Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, Ch. 3, Introductory Note,
127-28 (Proposed Official Draft 1967). However, since the CPLR uses terminology similar
to that in the Act, it is believed that the present wording should be retained. See, e.g., N.Y.
CPLR 3211(a) (2): "A party may move for judgment dismissing one or more causes of action
asserted against him on the ground that . . . the court has not jurisdiction of the subject
matter of the cause of action."
176. Dunstan v. Higgins, 138 N.Y. 70, 33 N.E. 729 (1893).
177. Bata v. Chase Safe Deposit Co., 99 N.Y.S.2d 535, 571-75 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd
sub nona. Bata v. Bata, 279 App. Div. 182, 108 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1st Dept. 1951), aff'd 306
N.Y. 96, 115 N.E.2d 672 (1953). The subject matter jurisdiction issue was abandoned on
the appeals. See also Bata v. Bata, 39 Del. Ch. 548, 555, 170 A.2d 711, 717-18 (Sup. Ct.
1961).
178. H. Goodrich, supra note 143, at 396; Nussbaum, supra note 171, at 231-34. Com-
pare Falcon Mfg. (Scarborough) Ltd. v. Ames, 53 Misc. 2d 332, 278 N.Y. S.2d 684 (N.Y.
City Civ. Ct. 1967) which states that there must be a disclosure in the judgment of jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter, with Caruso v. Caruso, 106 N.J. Eq. 130, 148 A. 882 (1930)
in which it was alleged that a Florentine tribunal, rather than a Neopolitan tribunal, was
the proper court to decide the Italian action. The New Jersey court said:
It is not denied that the civil and penal tribunal of Naples is a court of general
jurisdiction, and was invested with the powers such as were exercised by that tribu-
nal in the matters relating to the intestate's estate, and the claim made, on behalf
of the infant, by its gutardian ad litem, is, in substance, that the tribunal was with-
out jurisdiction in the instant case, because the venue of the proceedings should
have been laid within the territorial jurisdiction of the civil and penal tribunal of
Florence, and contending that the city was the last domicile of the intestate, which
statement, however, is disputed. This, obviously, was a matter for the Italian court
to examine into and decide, if the question had been raised there, but at any rate,
is not for use to take notice of, or to pass upon here.
Id. at 134, 148 A. at 884.
179. H. Goodrich, supra note 143, at 396; Smit & Miller, supra note 168, at 33-34;
Nussbaum, supra note 171, at 231-34.
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cause section 2 alone will weed out judgments that are invalid at home. 80
Sister state judgments are differently treated, of course. If the first state pro-
vides that the defect can be attacked only on appeal, full faith and credit for-
bids collateral attack in a second state.
18 '
Section 4(a) (3) would remove any doubt whether such a rule applies to
foreign country judgments. 82 It does not.
The rule codified by section 4(a) (3) has been criticized in this country and
elsewhere:
In addition to indirect jurisdiction, must the jurisdiction and
competence under the foreign law be examined by the court applied to?
The answer should definitely be in the negative. Where the foreign
court had jurisdiction according to the standard set by the lex fori,
all interests of the forum are safeguarded. The foreign court is called
upon and is better equipped to apply the foreign law in respect of
the functions and organization of its judiciary; so if the foreign
court by a final judgment, deemed itself to have jurisdiction and com-
petence, re-examination of this question by the forum in unwar-
ranted.
83
Ordinarily, a European judgment once rendered cannot be attacked collateral-
ly.18 4 To refuse to inquire into the competence of a foreign court would be to
treat it as it would be in further proceedings in the state of rendition. Problems
of proving the foreign law, which determines whether competence was present,
would be avoided. 85
The common law defense has not, however, been without its supporters.8 0
The reasoning behind it is simply that a judgment rendered by an incom-
petent court is not, according to American concepts, a valid judgment. 1 7 And
no constitutional provision demands that a foreign country judgment be re-
180. See supra, note 109 and accompanying text; and cf. H. Smit & A. Miller, Inter-
national Cooperation in Civil Litigation: A Report on Practices and Procedures Prevailing
in the United States 39 (1961).
181. See generally Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, § 92(c), comment i,
§§ 97, 105 (Proposed Official Draft, 1967).
182. See id. § 98, comment f.
183. Nussbaum, supra note 171, at 231. See also Castel, Jurisdiction and Money
Judgments Rendered Abroad, Anglo-American and French Practice Compared, 4 McGill
LJ. 150, 186-91 (1958).
184. Smit, International Res Judicata in the Netherlands: A Comparative Analysis,
16 Buffalo L. Rev. 165, 181 n.81 (1966).
185. Castel, supra note 183, at 190.
186. Professor Smit believes the defense should be retained. Smit, International Res
Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States, 9 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 44, 50, 54 (1962).
That a country does not permit collateral attack on its own judgments is not a sufficient
reason for according similar immunity to foreign judgments. Res judicata policies pertaining
to foreign judgments are of diluted strength because relitigation of a question is not a
mere duplication: different procedural and substantive rules are likely to be applicable in
the foreign forum. The res judicata rationale of fairness to the litigants, then, by avoiding
repeated and harrassing litigation, is not necessarily violated. Smit, supra note 184, at 181-82.
187. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 92, comment i; §§ 97, 105 (Proposed
Official Draft, 1967). As to sister state judgments, see text accompanying and authority cited
in note 180, supra.
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cognized because it is valid where rendered. 188 The problem of reference to
the foreign rules of competence is real 8 9 but not unduly burdensome when it
is remembered that the second court must also examine the foreign law under
Section 2. 100
An early English case' 91 suggests that a distinction be made between the
first court's characterization of the nature of the cause, and competence over
the type of action characterized. Thus, if the first court characterizes the sub-
ject matter as a commercial transaction, a second court will not ask whether a
commercial transaction was indeed involved, but only whether the foreign
court was competent to deal with such matters. 192 Adoption of such an approach
could mitigate some of the difficulties of dealing with foreign procedural law
imposed by section 4(a) (3).
Although the requirement of subject matter competence has appeared in
English cases, there is no equivalent in the British legislation on foreign
judgments or in the treaties. 193
The concept of subject matter jurisdiction may be too deeply ingrained
in American law to be casually discarded in legislation of this type. But critics
of the rule have raised formidable objections. Rules relating to subject matter
competence, unlike rules claiming jurisdiction over defendants, are primarily
a matter of the internal organization of a country's courts. Section 2, as
emphasized above, adequately screens out judgments void where rendered.
Others, not subject to attack in the first state, but not rendered by a compe-
tent court, may or may not demand nonrecognition. A number of factors
may influence the decisions to accord conclusive effect: whether the tribunal
had limited or special expertise, for example, which would affect the quality
of the judgment, and the fairness of holding the judgment debtor bound by it.
A tolerable and, it is believed, desirable compromise between the conflicting
policies would be to omit the requirement from section 4(a) and include it in
section 4(b), which makes nonrecognition discretionary.
2. Situations in which a foreign judgment need not be recognized. Sec-
188. Compare Pemberton v. Hughes, (1899) -1 Ch. 871, in which an English court
recognized a Florida divorce without inquiring whether the judgment was void in Florida
for lack of competence. Harper, Collateral Attack upon Foreign Judgments: The Doctrine
of Pemberton v. Hughes, 29 Mich. L. Rev. 661 (1931), severely criticizes the case, primarily
on the ground that the judgment was invalid in Florida.
189. See Castel, supra note 183, at 190. There is considerable disagreement among
Canadian scholars concerning "this doubtful requirement that the foreign court be a proper
court." Id., at 186. Professor Castel agrees with Professor Nussbaum, supra note 171, and
has recommended that Canada accept the principle that "The courts of the forum will
not inquire whether the foreign court is the proper court under its own law." Castel, §upra
note 183, at 202.
190. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
191. Vanquelin v. Bouard, [1863], 15 C.B. (N.S.) 341.
192. Castel, supra note 183, at 188.
193. The British act provides that the foreign court must have had jurisdiction "in
the circumstances of the case," 23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 13, § 4(1)(a)(ii), which has been in-
terpreted as a reaffirmance of the principle that jurisdiction is to be determined by the law
of the forum. Castel, supra note 183, at 196.
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tion 4(b) permits the second court to exercise discretion in determining whether
a judgment will be denied recognition on one of the grounds listed. These
grounds are not directed at the validity of the judgment as such, but are
concerned with the interests of the parties and of the second state.
A. The defendant did not receive notice in sufficient time to enable him
to defend.19 4 The provision will probably have greatest relevance with respect
to foreign default judgments,195 although unlike the British act and some pro-
posed multilateral treaties it is not confined to cases in which the defendant
did not appear.' 96 The fact that the defendant was served in accordance with
the foreign rules, or that the judgment is valid in the first state, will not neces-
sarily save the judgment.197 Generally, the same standards that are applied to
sister state judgments are applied to foreign judgments in respect of notice,
although where questioned the notice given in a foreign proceeding may be sub-
jected to closer scrutiny.
98
The Act does not provide that an appearance by the defendant mitigates
the rule of this section. This is in contrast to the traditional rule for domestic
judgments, under which a defendant may be deemed to have waived defects
in personal jurisdiction, such as sufficient notice, by a voluntary appearance.19 9
However, the second court is free to take this into account, along with such
factors as the reasonableness of the method of notification and, presumably, such
circumstances as the difficulty of the defense.
B. The judgment was obtained by fraud.200 This section is clearly in
accord with New York law which has consistently regarded fraud as a ground
for nonrecognition. 201 However, it has in the past been understood that only
extrinsic fraud was available as a defense.2 02 Extrinsic fraud deprives the ag-
grieved party of an adequate opportunity to present his case to the court,
194. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 104 (Proposed Official Draft,
1967). Section 92 makes a reasonable method of notification a requisite of valid judgment.
Id.
195. The majority of New York cases on this question have dealt with judgments as
to which the defendant had received no notice at all. See, e.g., In re Paramythios' Estate,
15 Misc. 2d 133, 181 N.Y.S.2d 590 (Sur. Ct. 1958); In re Deckert's Will, 141 N.Y.S.2d 855
(Sur. Ct. 1955).
196. Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act of 1933, 23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 13,
§ 4(1) (a) (iii); Article 27(2) of the EEC Draft, 2 CCH Comm. Mkt. Rep. fig 6003, 6031;
§ 4(b) of the Model Act of the International Law Association, Report of the Fifty-First
(Tokyo) Conference xvii, xviii (1964).
197. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 104, comment a (Proposed Official
Draft, 1967).
198. Reese, supra note 168, at 789-90.
199. See generally Homburger & Laufer, Appearance and Jurisdictional Motions in
New York, 14 Buffalo L. Rev. 374, 375-76 (1965).
200. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 115, comments d, f (Proposed
Official Draft, 1967).
201. Perkins v. Guarantee Trust Co., 274 N.Y. 250, 8 N.E.2d 849 (1937); Dunstan
v. Higgins, 138 N.Y. 70, 33 N.E. 729 (1893) (dictum); Goldstein v. Goldstein, 166 N.Y.
S. 1074 (Sup. Ct. 1917); In re Topcuoglu's Will, 11 Misc. 2d 859, 174 N.Y.S.2d 260 (Sur.
Ct. 1958).
202. H. Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 397-98 (4th ed. 1964); Reese, supra note 168,
at 793-94.
FOREIGN JUDGMENT RECOGNITION
while intrinsic fraud involves matters actually passed upon by the first court 2 0 3
The Act makes no such distinction, which is consistent with the current trend.2 0 4
New York has taken a similar approach in the CPLR with respect to domestic
judgments.205 The omission of any distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic
fraud has been authoritatively interpreted as permitting both kinds to be a
basis for relief: "The distinction proved to be shadowy and uncertain of ap-
plication, and has been discarded from New York practice as it was from
federal practice.1206 Acts of fraud previously regarded as insufficient to vacate
a judgment-perjury, misrepresentation of the merits and validity of a defense,
conspiracy to name as a plaintiff one not the real party in interest, and con-
cealed fraud in the transaction that is the subject of the suit-would now
presumably give rise to relief.2 0 7
This brief review of current law on fraud in domestic judgments is im-
portant, because with respect to the various defenses to recognition of foreign
judgments, American courts may depart from the standards of full faith and
credit as applied to sister state judgments208 The question of fraud will almost
certainly be decided under the law of the second state rather than the first 20 19
because "it seems unlikely that an American court would permit the issue of
fraud to be settled conclusively by a foreign law which might be based upon
conceptions of fairness and justice at substantial variance with those prevail-
ing in this country."210 Although it has been held that when the foreign court
actually passed on the question of fraud, that issue would not be re-examined
on the merits,2 1 1 the contrary view has been pressed.2 1 2 In any event, since in-
trinsic fraud is now cause for relief from local judgments, foreign country
judgments are likely to be refused recognition on the same ground.
Athough the British Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act2 13
and the various draft multilateral conventions regard fraud as a mandatory
ground for nonrecognition, 214 it is unclear -whether they refer to extrinsic fraud
203. Reese, supra note 168, at 794.
204. Where the second court applies the law of the first with respect to granting relief
on grounds of fraud, the usual result for sister state judgments will be that only extrinsic
fraud is a defense. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 115, comment d (Proposed
Official Draft, 1967). But see Restatement of Judgments § 118, comment f (1942).
205. N.Y. CPLR 5015(a)(3).
206. 5 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, supra note 175, at J 5015.09.
207. Id.
208. Reese, supra note 168, at 796-98.
209. Id. at 794; Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the
United States, 9 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 44, 52 (1962). In re Topcuoglu's Will, 11 Misc. 2d 859,
174 N.Y.S.2d 260 (Sur. Ct. 1958) and Ambatielos v. Foundation Co., 203 Misc. 470, 116
N.Y.S.2d 641 (Sup. Ct. 1952) apply New York standards of fraud.
210. Reese, supra note 168, at 794.
211. Id. at 795.
212. A. Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 199 (Rev. ed. 1962).
213. 23 & 24 Geo. 5. c. 13, § 4(1) (a) (iv).
214. The Draft Convention of the EEC mentions only incompatibility with public
policy, but public policy in the civil law is a very broad concept which often includes
fraud. Note, The Enforcement of Judgments: A Convention with Germany, 36 Br. Y.B.
Int'l L. 359, 365 (1960). The International Law Association Model Act includes both
public policy and fraud. See supra note 196, at xix.
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only.2 15 Since the American defense is likely to be much broader, it seems
advisable to retain the discretion the Act permits the courts.210
C. The cause of action is repugnant to the public policy of the second
state.
The subsection offers a choice of terminology. Since "cause of action" is
the term used in the CPLR217 it should be adopted, and "claim for relief"
omitted.
The defense of public policy is universally allowed.218 It is designed
primarily to safeguard the citizens and institutions of the second state210
while those of fraud and lack of sufficient notice affect more directly the in-
terests of the litigants themselves.220 Public policy is said to be offended if the
subject matter of the judgment arouses local opposition to enforcement,
221
but the "opposition policy should need to be particularly violent to overcome
enforcement. There is a wider public policy in favor of recognition .... 222
The "wider public policy in favor of recognition" would seem to provide
a more than adequate rationale for placing this defense in the discretionary
category. The court applied to is then in a position to weigh the strength of
the local policy against the justice of according recognition.
New York cases have consistently allowed the defense.223 Indeed, it is
not unusual to find other defenses couched in public policy terms, especially
that of lack of jurisdiction. 22 4 This subsection makes it clear, however, that
it is the cause of action which must be the offender, as was alleged in Ainba-
tielos v. Foundation Co. 22 5 The defendant objected that enforcement of a
British judgment based on a contract under which the plaintiff was to obtain
contracts for the defendant Greek government would violate local public policy.
215. In the Netherlands, the distinction does not exist. Smit, International Res Judicata
in the Netherlands: A Comparative Analysis, 16 Buffalo L. Rev. 165, 193 n.159 (1966).
216. Maryland has incorporated this provision into § 4(a), under which non-recogni-
tion would be mandatory. 9B U.L.A. 68 (1966).
217. E.g., N.Y. CPLR §§ 3211, 5012.
218. Although the content of the concept is not necessarily a constant, it is a "uni-
versally recognized principle that a foreign judgment will not be accorded recognition if a
public policy of the forum would thereby be violated." Nussbaum, Public Policy and the
Political Crisis in the Conflict of Laws, 49 Yale L.J. 1027, 1056 (1940). It appears in the
British Act and in all of the proposed multilateral conventions. Foreign Judgments (Recip-
rocal Enforcement) Act of 1933, 23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 13 § 4(1) (a) (v) ; Article 27(1) of the
Draft Convention of the EEC, 2 CCH Comm. Mkt. Rep. 11 6003, 6031; § 4(d) of the
International Law Association Model Act, supra note 196; at xix.
219. Reese, supra note 168, at 796-98.
220. Id.
221. H. Smit & A. Miller, International Cooporation in Civil Litigation: A Report
on Practices and Procedures Prevailing in the United States 33 (1961); Reese, supra note
168, at 796-98.
222. H. Goodrich, supra note 202, at 399.
223. Cowans v. Ticonderoga Pulp & Paper Co., 219 App. Div. 120, 219 N.Y.S. 284
(3d Dep't 1927); In re Davis' Will, 31 Misc. 2d 270, 219 N.Y.S.2d 533 (Sur. Ct. 1961).
224. See, e.g., Plugmay Ltd. v. National Dynamics Corp., 48 Misc. 2d 913, 916-17,
266 N.Y.S.2d 240, 244-45 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1966). The Common Market Preliminary
Draft Convention provides specifically that the question of jurisdiction is not one of
public policy, which seems to be the proper view. 2 CCH Comm. Mkt. Rep. ffff 6003, 6032.
225. 203 Misc. 470, 116 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
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The court held that such contracts do not, in themselves, violate New York
policy unless it appears that the parties contemplated corrupt methods. In re-
sponse to defendant's contention that the judgment should not be enforced be-
cause it violated Greek public policy, the court noted that this merely resulted
in it being unenforceable in that country.
Generally, enforcement will -be accorded a foreign judgment unless the
original claim is "repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just
in the State where enforcement is sought." 226 A foreign judgment will not be
denied recognition or enforcement merely because the original cause of action
has been abolished,227 but if the policy violated is closely related to ideas
of fairness and justice, conclusive effect will be withheld.
228
D. The judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment.
229
Although full faith and credit requires, in the case of sister state judg-
ments, that conclusive effect be given to the later judgment if, under the law
of the state where it was rendered, it supersedes the earlier, no firm prediction
can be made when extranational judgments are involved. 23 0 Again, the Act
reflects rather than changes the prevailing practice. Since the defense codi-
fied by this subsection does not result in mandatory nonrecognition, however,
the court applied to may take into account the res judicata rules of the court
which rendered the later judgment.
The New York case law on this subject can be readily summarized.
Ambatielos v. Foundation Co.2 31 held that the judgment later in time pre-
vails. Although the decision noted that the earlier Greek judgment had been
interposed in the English proceedings which culminated in the judgment
sought to be enforced in New York, it did not include any reference to English
res judicata rules, on which point it has been criticized.232 Perkins v. DeWitt,
233
decided the same year, held that notwithstanding its inconsistency with an
earlier New York judgment, a Philippine judgment could be pleaded in defense
of an action on the New York judgment in the New York courts by a defendant
226. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 117, comment c (Proposed Officjal
Draft, 1967).
227. Neporany v. Fir, 5 A.D.2d 438, 173 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1958), (a Canadian judgment
for seduction and criminal conversion can be sued upon in New York, notwithstanding
that the cause of action was abolished here).
228. In re Davis' Will, 31 Misc. 2d 270, 219 N.Y.S.2d 533 (Sur. Ct. 1961).
229. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 114 (Proposed Official Draft,
1967) which states:
A judgment will not be recognized or enforced in other states if an inconsistent,
but valid, judgment is subsequently rendered in another action between the parties
and if the earlier judgment is superseded by the later judgment under the local law
of the state where the later judgment was rendered.
230. Id., comment d.
231. 203 Misc. 470, 116 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
232. Smit. International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States,
9 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 44, 46, n.13 (1962).
233. 279 App. Div. 903, 111 N.Y.S.2d 752 (1952).
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who was not a party to the earlier local judgment.2 34 Nothing in this sub-
section would have required a different result in either case.
This subsection is essentially similar to the corresponding provision of
the British act which does not make denial of recognition mandatory on this
ground.2 35 Proposed conventions, on the other hand, generally specify that
the foreign judgment must not contravene a judgment on the same cause ren-
dered in the forum.
2 36
E. The proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement
between the parties that the dispute was to be settled in some other manner.
2
No New York case has been found on this proposition. 238 Although the de-
cisions confirm that an agreement by the parties that the foreign court shall
decide their dispute will be honored in this country, consent as a basis for
jurisdiction is a different question from that presented by this subsection.239
American courts will generally give effect to a fair and reasonble agreemenlt
by the parties as to the place of litigation, although such a contract cannot
oust a court of jurisdiction.2 40 In view of the large numbers of forum select-
ing agreements, especially in certain types of international contracts, 241 there
234. A 1930 Philippine judgment ascertained rights to the disputed property, but was
denied conclusive effect in New York on, inter alia, grounds of fraud by Perkins v. Guaranty
Trust Co., 274 N.Y. 250, 8 N.E.2d 849 (1937), which went on to consider the merits of
the cause and reached a different result. Following this, another action was instituted in the
Philippines culminating in a decision consistent with the 1930 Philippine judgment. The
memorandum decision of the appellate division noted that the defendant in the present
action was not a party to the earlier New York action. That decision may be determinative
of defendant's rights, but since there was a subsequent foreign judgment, "defendant is
entitled to assert it as a defense to the present action. We do not pass upon its ultimate
effect, but believe that its efficacy can better be determined at the trial than upon motion."
Perkins v. DeWitt, 279 App. Div. 903, 111 N.Y.S.2d 752 (1952).
235. Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act of 1933, 23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 13,
§ 4(1) (b).
236. See, e.g., Article 28 of the Preliminary Draft Convention of the Common Market
countries, 2 CCH Comm. Mkt. Rep. fIU 6003, 6032; § 4(e) of the International Law Asso-
ciation Model Act, supra note 196, at xix.
237. Compare Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 80 (Proposed Official Draft,
1967): "The parties' agreement as to the place of the action cannot oust a state of judicial
jurisdiction, but such an agreement will be given effect unless it is unfair or unreasonable."
Under art. 17 of the Common Market Draft Convention, an agreement by the parties desig-
nating a court of a member state to decide a dispute confers upon that court, with certain
exceptions, exclusive jurisdiction. 2 CCH Comm. Mkt. Rep. fffT 6003, 6021. Section 5(2) (a)
of the International Law Association Model Act provides that the first court had no juris-
diction if the bringing of the proceeding was "contrary to an express agreement between
the parties under which the dispute in question was to be settled otherwise than by a pro-
ceeding in that court." Supra note 196, at xx-xxi
238. For a statement of current New York practice with respect to forum selecting
clauses when the cause is presented in the first instance, see Export Ins. Co. v. Mitsui Steam-
ship Co., Ltd., 26 A.D.2d 436, 274 N.Y.S.2d 977 (1966).
239. Such decisions generally uphold the jurisdiction of the foreign court on the ground
of consent. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Burnstine, 259 N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706 (1931). See generally
Reese, The Contractual Forum: Situation in the United States, 13 Am. J. Comp. L. 187
(1964).
240. See supra note 237.
241. Nadelmann, The Hague Conference on Private International Law and the
Validity of Forum Selecting Clauses, 13 Am. J. Comp. L. 157 (1964).
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would seem to be no reason why American courts should not have similar dis-
cretion with respect to judgments originating abroad.
There is no international agreement on the validity of forum selecting
agreements, especially on whether the parties may exclude the jurisdiction of
the courts of communities which would, but for the stipulation, be available.242
However, the persistence of the clauses, and the argument that their disallow-
ance will only force the parties into arbitration agreements, have inspired
several attempts to achieve uniformity.243
Against this background, the Act makes recognition or nonrecognition of
a foreign country judgment on the ground that an agreement of the parties
was violated a matter of discretion. One factor that may influence a decision
is the effect given such clauses in the second state. Many American decisions
denying them effect have been due to a hostility to adhesion contracts that
are the product of unequal bargaining power.244 Others reflect an unwillingness
to force a local resident or domiciliary to a foreign forum.2 45 If such factors
are behind a foreign judgment, section 4(b) (5) does not require recognition.
On the other hand, even if the contract was fair and reasonable, the Act does
not require that a judgment by a different court be nonconclusive.
The popularity of forum selecting clauses in international contracts (from
which a large proportion of judgments to which the Act would be applicable
may be expected to come), and the apparent trend in the United States to
grant them effect, 246 clearly justify the rule of this subsection.
F. The foreign court was a seriously inconvenient forum.
This subsection presents a real innovation in the Act. With the exception
of the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act,247 such a pro-
vision has not been incorporated into other acts or treaties in the general area
of international judicial cooperation. 2 " Nor is it codified in New York legisla-
242. Id. at 157-58.
243. Id. The Tenth Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law,
which also produced the first six articles of a proposed convention of recognition and en-
forcement of judgments, prepared a draft of a Convention on the General Jurisdiction of
Contractual Forums, Adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee, set forth id. at 160. The question
has been raised whether the two proposals should be combined. Id. at 158. See also Graveson,
The Tenth Session of the Hague Conference of Private International Law, 14 Int'l & Comp.
L.Q. 528, 576 (1965).
244. Reese, The Contractual Forum: Situation in the United States, 13 Am. J. Comp.
L. 187, 188 (1964).
245. Id.
246. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 80 (Proposed Official Draft, 1967).
247. Text and comments appear at 11 Am. J. Comp. L. 417 (1962). Section 1.05 pro-
vides: "When the court finds that in the interest of substantial justice the action should be
heard in another forum, the court may stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on
any conditions that may be just."
248. Cf. Article 15 of the 1964 Hague Conference Convention on the Choice of Court:
"Any contracting state may reserve the right not to recognize agreements on the choice of
court if the dispute has no connection with the chosen court, or if, in the circumstances, it
would be seriously inconvenient for the matter to be dealt with by the chosen court."
Graveson, The Tenth Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, 14
Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 528, 574 (1965). On the parties choice of court, see supra notes 237-42
and accompanying text.
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tion, although the doctrine of forum non conveniens is a vital one in this
state
2 49
Forum non conveniens permits a court to decline to entertain a case
appropriately filed under prevailing rules of competence if the court is seriously
inconvenient for presentation of the action, provided that an appropriate forum
is available to the plaintiff.250 Whether a cause, when it is presented in the
first instance, will be dismissed under this rule "depends largely upon the
facts of the particular case and is in the sound discretion of the trial judge.1
2 1
Similarly, as with all of section 4(b), whether a foreign judgment will be de-
nied recognition on this ground is a matter of discretion.
Application of this subsection is limited to cases in which personal service
is the sole ground of jurisdiction. Personal service within the state is a funda-
mental basis of jurisdiction in Anglo-American law,252 while it is unknown on
the continent. There, service is merely a means of giving notice and jurisdiction
is conceived as pre-existing the actual bringing of suit.253 Thus, it would seem
that the objection could rarely, if ever, be raised against judgments from
civil law countries. However, it may be applied against such judgments where
the basis for jurisdiction, under the civil law, is, for example, one of the so-
called "exorbitant" grounds, 254 which are not recognized in other countries. 25
If a defendant, temporarily in France, was served there, but the basis for
jurisdiction under French law was Article 14 of the Code Civil which permits
a French national to sue a foreigner in France on the sole ground that he is
a foreigner (one of the exorbitant bases) ,256 the question might arise whether
249. 1 Weinstein, Kom & Miller, New York Civil Practice ff 301.07 (1966).
250. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 84 (Proposed Official Draft, 1967);
Ginsburg, The Competent Court in Private International Law: Some Observations on
Current Views in the United States, 20 Rutgers L. Rev. 89, 98-100 (1965).
251. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 84, comment b (Proposed Official
Draft, 1967).
252. Id., § 28, comment a. In England, jurisdiction is obligatory where the defendant
is served there, but it has been suggested that English law provide that in extreme cases,
where the subject matter has no real connection with England that the courts may
decline to be seized with the cause. Graupner, Some Recent Aspects of the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Western Europe, 12 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 367, 371-72
(1963).
253. Graupner, supra note 252, at 376; A. Nussbaum, Principles of Private Interna-
tional Law 193 (1943).
254. Examples of "exorbitant bases" include Art. 14 of the French and Luxembourg
codes which allows nationals of those countries to sue in the national courts a foreigner
on the sole ground that he is a foreigner, even when the litigation has no connection with
the forum. Germany allows a suit in German courts against any defendant who has assets
in Germany, provided that he is neither domiciled nor resident there. See generally Weser,
Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction in the Common Market Countries, 10 Am. J. Comp. L. 323
(1961).
255. Nadelmann, Non-Recognition of American Money Judgments Abroad and What
to Do About It, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 236, 261 (1957). The American basis of presence and
service within the forum (the "transient rule") is regarded as exorbitant abroad, and if
this country were to enter a treaty on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judg-
ments, it is highly probable that it would be excluded as an acceptable basis of jurisdiction.
Lenhoff, International Law and Rules on International Jurisdiction, 50 Cornell L.Q. 5, 8
(1964).
256. See supra note 254.
FOREIGN JUDGMENT RECOGNITION
the second court should regard Article 14 or the fact of service as the ground
for the exercise of jurisdiction. Since service alone, while the defendant was
within the state's territory, is sufficient by American standards, in personam
jurisdictional requirements are met.257 However, if neither the cause of action
nor the defendant had any connection with France, a good case for nonrecog-
nition on the ground of forum non conveniens is presented. Presumably the
second court would apply whatever domestic standards would pertain to
local actions. On the other hand, if the defendant had other ties with the
judgment-rendering state acceptable by American standards, on which juris-
diction was based, section 4(b) (6) would be unavailable as a defense.
This provision should meet at least partially the objection to existing law
on foreign judgments that it is not fair to a defendant who had no close ties to
the first court to recognize a judgment which jeopardizes all of his personal
assets .258
Conclusion. Subsection (a) of this section lists three general grounds
for mandatory refusal of recognition, all of which require application of do-
mestic standards of validity. The final, conclusive and enforceable character
of the judgment in the first state is a bare minimum. If its system or laws
are unfair, if its claim to jurisdiction over the defendant is overreaching, or
if it did not bestow competence on the court to hear the case, the judgment
cannot be recognized.
The first two provisions of subsection (a) entail a direct application of
domestic standards. The interests of the second state in doing so are evident.
The third provision of the subsection-the requirement of subject matter
jurisdiction-only indirectly involves domestic standards and the interests
served are less evident. The application of domestic standards is indirect
because those standards generally state that the judgment of an incompetent
court is invalid. Whether the court is indeed incompetent, however, must be
determined by the law of the first state.25 9 And here the requirement becomes
rather idiosyncratic. American law postulates competence as a condition for
a judgment's validity, that is, its immunity from collateral attack.260 Ordi-
narily, however, a European judgment cannot be collaterally attacked.26 1 But
under section 4(a) (3) this fact is irrelevant.
The rule would nevertheless be justifiable if the interests of the second
state were well served by it. The competence of courts is generally an internal
matter, but in some circumstances a second court may have good reason for
denying recognition to a judgment even though it is valid where rendered.
257. Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States,
9 U.C.LA.L. Rev. 44, 51, nA8 (1962).
258. Id. at 67.
259. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 92, comment i (Proposed Official
Draft, 1967).
260. See id., § 105.
261. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
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Such a situation might arise where a commercial matter was settled by a
civil court. If the civil court was wholly lacking in expertise with respect to
the subject matter of the action, the losing party may well have been denied
his day in court. In other cases, the incompetence of the court may not have
been serious. The possibility of appeal in the first state is another factor to
be considered.
For these reasons, it is recommended that this provision be removed
from subsection (a) and incorporated as (1) of subsection (b).
Subsection (b) is a fairly straightforward codification of local law. It
makes, however, two innovations in (5) and (6). Although no directly sup-
porting authority has been found in New York, it is believed that both are
desirable and should be retained.
§ 5. [Personal Jurisdiction].-(a) The foreign judgment shall
not be refused recognition for lack of personal jurisdiction if
(1) the defendant was served personally in the foreign state;
(2) the defendant voluntarily appeared in the proceedings, other
than for the purpose of protecting property seized or threatened
with seizure in the proceedings or of contesting the jurisdiction of the
court over him;
(3) the defendant prior to the commencement of the proceedings
had agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign court with
respect to the subject matter involved;
(4) the defendant was domiciled in the foreign state when the
proceedings were instituted, or, being a body corporate had its prin-
cipal place of business, was incorporated, or had otherwise acquired
corporate status, in the foreign state;
(5) the defendant had a business office in the foreign state and
the proceedings in the foreign state involved a [cause of action] [claim
for relief] arising out of business done by the defendant through that
office in the foreign state; or
(6) the defendant operated a motor vehicle or airplane in the
foreign state and the proceedings involved a [cause of action] [claim
for relief] arising out of such operation.
(b) The courts of this state may recognize other bases of jurisdiction.
Comment. When the first court will be deemed by a second to have had
jurisdiction over the defendant in the foreign proceeding is perhaps one of
the most difficult problems impeding international cooperation in this field.2 0 2
Not only have the bases for jurisdiction been widely different in common law
and civil law countries, but most countries recognize only bases permitted to
their own courts. And even this must be qualified. Only some of the juris-
dictional bases on which a court will act are permitted, for recognition purposes,
to other states.26
3
262. See Lenhoff, International Law and Rules on International Jurisdiction, 50 Cornell
L.Q. 5, 22-23 (1964).
263. "What the forum actually does amounts to testing, in the forum's own terms, a
requirement for granting territorial expansion to the res judicata effect of the foreign judg-
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In an era of expanding jurisdiction, section 5 has the advantage of not
limiting acceptable bases. This avoids the difficulties caused by the British act
which "hardly extends the common law rules based on the principle of effec-
tiveness and submission; in fact, it merely clarifies certain points of doubt as
to whether a person was or was deemed to be subject to the first State's
territorial dominion so that service in the first State upon him could be ac-
cepted as valid under the time-honoured common law rule appearing now in
a statutory garb." 264 This limiting aspect of the British act has been deemed
generally detrimental to the cause of international agreement.
26 5
On the other hand, the Uniform Act avoids either confining itself to or
approving for recognition purposes the many new bases states have permitted
their courts through various forms of long-arm legislation.2 6  These statutes
have brought American notions of in personam jurisdiction much closer to
those of the civil law countries, which, except for their so-called exorbitant
bases, generally require some nexus between the subject matter of the action,
or the defendant and the forum state2 67 In the view of many continental
jurists, the Anglo-American rule that jurisdiction may be based solely on per-
sonal service where the defendant has no contact with the forum other than
transience is as objectionable as continental exorbitant rules, which are under-
stood to be a ground for nonrecognition.26 8 However, no American jurisdiction
has abandoned the transient rule,269 and it is the first approved basis in
section 5 of the Act.
The application of domestic standards to foreign claims of jurisdiction
is common to many nations. It is found in Great Britain, Germany, Italy,
ment." Nussbaum, Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 221, 225 (1941).
There are also cases according recognition "even though apparently no basis is present
on which the recognizing court would have assumed jurisdiction." von Mehren & Trautman,
Recognition of Foreign Adjudication: A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 Harv. L. Rev.
1601, 1614 (1968).
264. Graupner, Some Recent Aspects of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in Western Europe, 12 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 367, 380-81 (1943).
265. Id. at 381. On the discrepancy between jurisdiction claimed and jurisdiction
recognized, see Castel, Jurisdiction and Money Judgments Rendered Abroad, Anglo-Ameri-
can and French Practice Compared, 4 McGill L.J. 152, 174-79 (1958).
266. Commissioners' Note, 9B U.L.A. 68-69 (1966).
267. Ginsburg, The Competent Court in Private International Law: Some Observations
on Current Views in the United States, 20 kutgers L. Rev. 89, 95 (1965). The exorbitant
rules of the Common Market countries are described, along with fundamental rules of
jurisdiction, in Weser, Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction in the Common Market Countries,
10 Am. J. Comp. L. 323 (1961). The purpose of the exorbitant rules is "to confer jurisdic-
tion on national courts when normally they would not have jurisdiction." Id.
268. See Lenhoff, supra note 255, at 8. The British Foreign judgments (Reciprocal
Enforcement) Act makes no mention of service within the jurisdiction, although judgments
based thereon may come within the clause providing that the first court shall be deemed
to have had jurisdiction if the basis is one recognized by the second state. Yntema, The
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Anglo-American Law, 33 Mich. L. Rev. 1129, 1163
(1935).
That judgments based on a civil law exorbitant basis are unenforceable see Nadelmann,
Non-Recognition of American Money Judgments Abroad and What to Do About It, 42
Iowa L. Rev. 236, 261 (1957).
269. Ginsburg, supra note 267, at 95.
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Luxembourg and France,27 0 and variously called "indirect jurisdiction," "corn-
patence g~narale indirect," or the "legislative fiction of the identical norm." 271
These terms all denote "judicial authority as determined under the law of
the state in which application is made for the enforcement [or recognition]
of a judgment rather than for initial adjudication of a claim., 2 72
With the conclusion of treaties, especially among the continental coun-
tries, and the various conferences and proposals designed to achieve cooperation
and uniformity in the field, some bases for jurisdiction have come to be
regarded as generally unobjectionable. 278 Among these are consent, domicil,
citizenship, ownership of property within the state, where the cause arose
from and is reasonably related to the defendant's ownership of the property,
and certain activities within the state where the cause arose out of those
activities 2 74 To the list may be added jurisdiction acquired by reason of the
defendant's counterclaim, or the parties' agreement that the court in question
should try their suit.2 7 5 The consensus is a loose one, and is in no way due to
any rule of international law, public or private, requiring such a result.270
But the acceptability of the bases is evident from the frequency of their
inclusion in treaties and proposed treaties.277
The remainder of this comment considers the possible effects of this
section if adopted in New York.
1. Acceptable bases of jurisdiction. The grounds for jurisdiction listed in
subsection (a) must be accepted by the courts of an enacting state. A judgment
based on one of them cannot be refused recognition for lack of personal
jurisdiction. Therefore it is important to determine whether they are in sub-
stantial agreement with New York law.
A. Personal service of the defendant in the foreign state.278 Since this
basis is unique to the common law, it will probably have application chiefly
to British and some commonwealth judgments.2 7 ) However, where a defendant
was served in the foreign state, but jurisdiction was founded on some other
270. Graupner, supra note 264, at 372, 378-79.
271. For discussion of these terms, see Ginsburg, supra note 267, at 92-93; Graupner,
supra note 264, at 372-74; Nussbaum, supra note 263, at 225; Smit, The Terms Jurisdiction
and Competence in Comparative Law, 10 Am. J. Comp. L. 164, 166 (1961).
272. Ginsburg, supra note 267, at 93, n.18.
273. Graupner, supra note 264, at 374-75; Nadelmann, Non-Recognition of American
Money Judgments Abroad and What to Do About It, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 236, 261 (1957).
274. Ginsburg, supra note 267, at 94-95.
275. Graupner, supra note 264, at 374-75.
276. See Lenhoff, supra note 262, at S.
277. See Ginsburg, supra note 267, at 94-99, noting that similar catalogues of accept-
able bases appear in the Draft Convention of the Common Market countries, 2 CCH
Comm. Mkt. Rep. 1 6033; the Model Act of International Law Association, Report of the
Fifty-First (Tokyo) Conference xvii, xix-xx (1964); and a 1962 Special Commission
Preliminary Draft Convention of the Hague Conference. See 10 Neth. Int'l L. Rev. 327,
328-33 (1963).
278. Personal service is omitted from the British Act. See supra note 268.
279. Service of process in the civil law has the function only of providing notice.
Ginsburg, supra note 267, at 90; Graupner, supra note 264, at 377.
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theory, the judgment may be recognized by reason of the fact of personal ser-
vice, even though the actual basis for jurisdiction under the foreign law is unac-
ceptable to the second state.280 This result could follow notwithstanding the




New York cases have assumed that recognition is to be granted an other-
wise valid foreign judgment when the defendant was served within the first
state.
282
B. The defendant voluntarily appeared in the foreign proceedings other
than for the purpose of protecting property seized, or about to be seized, or
of contesting the personal jurisdiction of the court. Unlike the preceding pro-
vision, this subsection echoes a similar section in the British act.28 3 Since
traditionally, a defendant may waive the defense of the court's lack of juris-
diction over him,284 such a waiver may be recognized when made elsewhere.
However, since no American state permits itself to acquire jurisdiction over a
defendant who has made a special appearance for the sole purpose of contesting
jurisdiction 28 5 a contrary claim by a foreign country will not be honored here.
But a voluntary appearance made under the conditions described is generally
regarded as binding the defendant to the court's jurisdiction over him. 28 6
This subsection should have no effect on section 4(b) (1) which, it will be
recalled, permits the second court to refuse recognition if the defendant had
not been notified of the foreign proceeding in time for him to prepare a de-
fense.28 7 Presumably if the defendant had appeared, but did not raise the
issue of insufficient notice, he waived that objection and the judgment cannot
be denied recognition for lack of jurisdiction. But section 4(b)(1) provides a
separate ground for nonrecognition which is available whether or not the defen-
dant entered an appearance.
C. The defendant previously agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the
foreign court with respect to the subject matter involved. 28 8 The rule of this
280. Smit, International .Res udicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States,
9 U.C.L.AL. Rev. 44, 51, n.48 (1962).
281. Supra, note 279.
282. See Dunstan v. Higgins, 17 N.Y.S. 887 (Sup. Ct. 1892), aff'd 138 N.Y. 70, 33
N.E. 729 (1893).
283. 23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 13, § 4(2)(a)(i).
284. See generally Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 33, 81 (Proposed
Official Draft, 1967).
The modern approach of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and CPLR results that
the "[diefendant's appearance of itself does not defeat the right to present jurisdictional
objections . .. [however, like other objections and defenses which may be waived they
are lost by defendant's failure to assert them timely." Homburger & Laufer, Appearance
and Jurisdictional Motions in New York, 14 Buffalo L. Rev. 374, 380, 383-84 (1965).
285. Restatement (Second), supra § 33, comment e and § 81, comment d.
286. See § 5(a)(i)(ii), (iii) of the Model Act of the International Law Association,
Report of the Fifty-First (Tokyo) Conference xvii, xix (1964), and the Common Market
Draft Convention, art. 18, 2 CCH Comm. Mkt. Rep. 1111 6003, 6022.
287. See supra notes 194-199 and accompanying text.
288. Cf. § 4(a) (5) of this Act and supra notes 237-46 and accompanying text.
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subsection is supported by New York authority.289 It is generally agreed that
nonresident parties may in advance consent to submit to foreign jurisdictions,
2 00
a consensus that is attested to by the presence of similar provisions in current
multilateral drafts on recognition and enforcement. 2 0' The latter generally
specify, however, that the agreement be "express" 292 or written or confirmed
in writing.293 Although the Act is less explicit, the sense of the subsection seems
to be that an express agreement, rather than one implied by the foreign law,
is required. 294 This interpretation of "consent" is found also in the Restate-
ment (Second) of Conflict of Laws.
205
D. Domicil when the proceedings were instituted, principle place of
business, or corporate status in the foreign state. "A person's domicil in a
state is a fair and reasonable basis upon which to ground his amenability to
suit there." 296 It is irrelevant whether the defendant was served personally
within the state, if, although temporarily absent, he was domiciled or ordin-
arily resident there at the time the proceedings were begun.
20 7
Nationality and citizenship as well as domicile have been asserted as bases
for the exercise of jurisdiction by New York courts,20 8 and it is said that
courts in the United States "will usually recognize and enforce a judgment
rendered in a foreign nation against a national of that nation."2 9 However,
289. The landmark decision is Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255 N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706 (1931).
290. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 32 and comments e, f (Proposed
Official Draft, 1967).
291. See § 5(1) (b) of the Model Act of the International Law Association, supra
note 286, at xix; art. 17 of the Common Market Draft, supra note 286, at f1 6021.
292. Section 5(1) (b) of the Model Act of the International Law Association, supra
note 286, at xix.
293. Article 17 of the Common Market Draft, supra note 286, at ff 6021.
294. Pope v. Heckscher, 266 N.Y. 114, 194 N.E. 53 (1934), held that a Canadian
court lacked jurisdiction over the defendant, a New York shareholder in a Canadian
corporation, although under Canadian law a shareholder, by the purchase of stock, thereby
agreed and subjected himself to the jurisdiction of Canadian courts. The Court of Appeals
reversed a lower court decision which found jurisdiction had been present, by analogy
to Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
Current authority regards the term "implied consent" as a misnomer, and holds that
the true base for jurisdiction is the act of the defendant in certain situations. Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 32, comment a, §§ 35-37 (Proposed Official Draft, 1967).
Two cases in which the judgment creditor, in an action in New York on the foreign
judgment, unsuccessfully asserted that the defendant consented to the proceedings are Kerr
v. Tagliavia, 101 Misc. 614, 168 N.Y.S. 697 (Sup. Ct. 1917), aff'd, 186 App. Div. 893, 172
N.Y.S. 901 (1st Dep't 1918), appeal dismissed, 229 N.Y. 542, 129 N.E. 907 (1920), and
Skandinaviska Granit Aktiebolaget v. Weiss, 226 App. Div. 56, 234 N.Y.S. 202 (2d Dep't
1929).
295. Section 32, comment a, and § 43, comment a (Proposed Official Draft, 1967).
296. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 29, comment a (Proposed Official
Draft, 1967). See also Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the
United States, 9 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 44, 67-68 (1962).
297. Rhodesian General Finance & Trading Trust Ltd. v. MacQuisten, 170 Misc. 996,
11 N.Y.S.2d 476 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
The Model Act of the International Law Association, § 5(1) (c) specifies that residence
(with no mention of domicil) is a sufficient basis. Supra note 286, at xix-xx. By contrast,
the Common Market Draft specifies domicile. Art. 2, supra note 286, at ff 6006.
298. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 31, comment C, and Reporter's
Note (Proposed Official Draft, 1967).
299. Id. comment c. ,
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they will not always do so, and in Grubel v. Nassauer° ° the New York Court of
Appeals refused extraterritorial effect to a valid German judgment against a
German citizen living in this state. The defendant had been absent from Ba-
varia for six years, and had applied for United States citizenship. He was
regarded as having acquired a domicil in New York.
The Act does not include either nationality or citizenship in the list of
acceptable bases. In view of the widespread mobility of persons who establish
close ties to other communities, regardless of nationality,301 and the number of
exceptions which American courts regard as justifying nonrecognition,
30 2 it
would have been unwise to have included either nationality or citizenship in
the Act. Moreover, domicile, rather than nationality is the principle basis in
many civil law countries, and nationality is absent from current multilateral
proposals.30 3 Similarly, the British act makes no mention of citizenship.
0 4
But adoption of uniform legislation in this state would not prevent recognition
of a judgment grounded on the defendant's citizenship in the proper case.30 5
It might be noted, however, that most nationality-based foreign judgments
held to be conclusive have involved status.306
A state's power over a corporation having its principle place of business
within its borders or having acquired a corporate status there is well settled.
0 7
Where the corporation either originally or subsequently acquired corporate
status in a state, a fair and reasonable basis for .the exercise of jurisdiction is
provided which "assures the existence of a place at which a corporation is
300. 210 N.Y. 149, 103 N.E. 1113 (1913).
301. See Smit, International Res Judicata in the Netherlands: A Comparative Analysis,
16 Buffalo L. Rev. 165, 184 (1966); International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in
the United States, 9 U.C.LA.L. Rev. 44, 67-68 (1962).
302. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 31 comment c (Proposed Official Draft,
1967) contains a summary of circumstances under which an American court will or will
not recognize judgments founded on the defendant's nationality.
303. It is mentioned in neither the International Law Association Model Act, -supra
note 286 or the EEC Draft, id. The latter, however, provides in art. 4 that with respect to
persons not domiciled in a member state, the laws of each country remain applicable. Id.
at f1 6008. That the defendant's domicil is the principle rule of jurisdiction in the Common
Market countries, see Weser, Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction in the Common Market Countries,
10 Am. J. Comp. L. 323, 328 (1961).
304. Yntema, The Enjorcement of Foreign Judgments in Anglo-American Law, 33
Mich. L. Rev. 1129, 1163 (1935). However, judgments based on nationality may come
within the clause providing that the foreign court shall be deemed to have had jurisdiction
if the basis is one recognized by the law of the second court. Id., 23-24 Geo. 5, c. 13,
§ 4(2) (c).
305. Section 5(b) of the Act provides that "The courts of this state may recognize
other bases of jurisdiction."
306. See, e.g., Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N.Y. 217, 28 Am. R. 129 (1878) a divorce case which
was distinguished on that ground in Grubel v. Nassauer, 210 N.Y. 149, 153, 103 N.E. 1113,
1114 (1913).
307. On jurisdiction over corporations, see generally Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws §§ 41-52 (Proposed Official Draft, 1967).
European countries postulate the siage social as the place where a corporate entity is
to be sued. The siege is roughly equivalent to the principle place of business. See Weser,
supra note 303, at 329-30.
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continuously amenable to suit.13 0 8 Similarly, the maintenance of a principle
place of business within a state establishes such contacts with it as justify
jurisdiction over it even for causes which do not arise from actual business done
within the state.30 9
Under this subsection, the cause of action need not have been related to
the actual business transacted in the first state. In such circumstances, where
section 302 of the CPLR does not apply, New York courts apply the tra-
ditional "doing business" test: that is, the corporation must be here perma-
nently and continuously.310 The Act is considerably stricter: the corporation
must maintain its principle place of business here, unless incorporated in the
state.
E. The defendant had a business office in the foreign state and the
proceedings in the foreign court involved a [cause of action] [claim for relief]
arising out of business done by the defendant through that office in the foreign
state.311 New York statutes generally use the term "cause of action" which,
for the sake of consistency, should be preferred here to "claim for relief."3 12
The Commissioner's Note to section 5 states that the Act does not codify
all the new bases of jurisdiction that have been recognized by the courts in
recent years.313 Thus far; New York courts have been reluctant to respect by
recognition the exercise of jurisdiction by foreign courts that closely corresponds
to the reach permitted by New York. One recent case had indicated that
long-arm legislation would decrease the number of judgments denied recognition
on jurisdictional grounds. The New York City civil court in Plugmay Ltd. v.
National Dynamics Corp.3 14 would have enforced, on summary judgment, an
English default judgment based on Order XI of the Rules of the High Court.
Order XI provides for service of a nonresident outside of England in a suit
for breach of a contract which was made in England. The civil court felt that
since Section 302 of the New York CPLR permitted New York courts to ac-
quire in personam jurisdiction in a similar manner, the English judgment should
be recognized. However, this judgment was reversed, although apparently on
the ground that the question of jurisdiction could best be decided at the trial.310
308. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 41, comment a (Proposed Official
Draft, 1967).
309. See id., § 47(2).
Section 5(1) (e) of the Model Act of the International Law Association provides that
the first court had jurisdication when "the judgment debtor, being a corporate body, was
at the time of the institution of this proceeding incorporated or had its [seat] [sige] in
the State of the original court, or at the time had its place of central administration or
principle place of business there." Supra note 286, at xx.
310. See McLaughlin, Supplementary Practice Commentary, § 301 CPLR (1967 Supp.).
311. Section 5(1)(f) of the Model Act of the International Law Association, supra
note 286, at xx, is nearly identical.
312. See supra note 2-1-7 and accompanying text.
313. Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act § 5, 9B U.L.A. 68.
314. 48 Misc. 2d 913, 266 N.Y.S.2d 240 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1966).
315. 53 Misc. 2d 451, 278 N.Y.S.2d 896 (Sup. Ct. 1967). See also H. L. Wilkinson &
Co. Ltd. v. Calvine Mills, Inc., 28 A.D.2d 675, 282 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1st Dep't 1967).
FOREIGN JUDGMENT RECOGNITION
Section 5(a) (5) of the Act does not go so far as section 302 in liberali-
zing acceptable bases of jurisdiction. It does, however, create a standard which,
when met by the foreign court, must be respected. The defendant-whether an
individual or a corporation 316-must have maintained a business office in the
foreign state and the cause of action, whether in tort or contract, must have
arisen from business done through that office. The Act avoids using terms
such as "doing business" or "transacting any business"8317 as a measure of the
reasonableness of holding the defendant answerable in the first forum. The
requirement of maintenance of a business office, however, indicates that much
more than the transaction of "any business" is necessary to hold the defendant
answerable even for acts arising out of activities within the state. It also pro-
vides a reasonably objective criterion for the second court, thereby skirting
many of the problems of interpretation that the phrases "doing business" and
"transacts any business" pose. 18 The sense of the section is that only com-
mercial transactions are encompassed, which again is shorter than the juris-
dictional reach granted New York courts by recent legislation.
319
Although section 5(b) of the Act permits recognition of judgments based
on other grounds, and no local decision pertinent to section 5(a) (5) has been
found, recent decisions indicate that New York courts will be reluctant to go
beyond it.
320
F. The defendant operated a motor vehicle or airplane in the foreign state
and the proceedings involved a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising out
of such operation. 3 2 1 Here again, for the sake of consistency, "cause of action"
should be elected rather than "claim for relief."
It need not be pointed out that this provision is much narrower than
current rules respecting domestic jurisdiction. 322 The Act only sets minima, and
enacting states are free to go beyond these by reason of section 5(b).823
Conclusion. Although domestic jurisdiction has been expanding, not all
316. Section 302 applies to both individuals and corporations, and such is the sense
of § 5(a) (5) of the Act.
317. See Homburger, The Reach of New York's Long-Arm Statute: Today and
Tomorrow, 15 Buffalo L. Rev. 61, 63 (1965) (distinguishing the terms).
318. Id.
319. Earlier authority that had limited N.Y.C.P.L.R. 302 (a) (1) to commercial trans-
actions has been weakened. McLaughlin, Supplementary Practice Commentary, § 302
CPLR (1967 Supp.).
320. See, e.g., Falcon Mfg. (Scarborough) Ltd. v. Ames, 53 Misc. 2d 332, 278 N.Y.S.2d
684 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1967). However, the Canadian "long-arm" statute, on which the
foreign judgment was based, was apparently construed by the court to permit a jurisdic-
tional reach longer than New York's.
321. Section 5(1)(h) of the Model Act of the International Law Association is
considerably broader, providing for jurisdiction for tort actions either at the place where
the defendant did the act which caused the injury, or at the place where the last event
necessary to make the defendant liable for the alleged tort occurred. Supra note 286, at xx.
322. See Homburger & Laufer, Expanding Jurisdiction over Foreign Torts: The 1966
Amendment of New York's Long-Arm Statute, 16 Buffalo L. Rev. 67 (1966).
323. The International Law Association Model Act, § 6, states that the bases for
jurisdiction listed in § 5 are not exclusive and that courts may accept additional bases.
Supra note 286, at xxi.
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states have been expanding at the same rate. Section 5 sets standards thought
to be generally acceptable in this country. In this way, a fairly high degree of
uniformity could be assured.
None of the provisions of section 5 contravene New York law. Probably
in some instances they do not go as far as local courts would. However, with
respect to those jurisdictional bases provided by section 302 of the CPLR,
the courts have been reluctant to recognize similar assumptions of power by
foreign countries. Although such mistrust of foreign systems has been criti-
cized,3 24 it may not be in all cases without justification.8 25
The Commissioners' Prefatory Note contains the best explanation of the
policy considerations behind section 5: "In codifying what bases for assump-
tion of personal jurisdiction will be recognized, which is an area of the law
still in evolution, the Act adopts the policy of listing bases accepted generally
today and preserving for the courts the right to recognize still other bases."M
20
,§ 6. [Stay in Case of Appeal].-If the defendant satisfies the
court either that an appeal is pending or that he is entitled and intends
to appeal from the foreign judgment, the court may stay the proceed-
ings until the appeal has been determined or until the expiration of
a period of time sufficient to enable the defendant to prosecute the
appeal.
8 27
This provision will avoid the anomaly of having a judgment recognized
by a second state even though it has been invalidated on appeal at home. If
the taking of an appeal, however, has the effect of vacating the judgment in
the first state, section 2 of the Act would probably prevent its recognition
in an enacting state.
The court's discretion with respect to the disposition of the recognition or
enforcement proceedings will prevent a judgment debtor from engaging in
delaying tactics.
§ 7. [Savings Clause].-This Act does not prevent the recog-
nition of a foreign judgment in situations not covered by this Act.
Foreign support judgments, and non-money judgments recognized by
New York courts, such as foreign probate decrees, and various status judg-
ments will continue to be governed by the common law evolved by the courts.
§ 8. [Uniformity of Interpretation].-This Act shall be so con-
strued as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law
of those states which enact it.
324. Graupner, Some Recent Aspects of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in Western Europe, 12 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 367, 368 (1963).
325. See Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United
States, 9 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 44 (1962).
326. 9B U.L.A. 64 (1966).
327. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 107, comment e, § 112, comment b
(Proposed Official Draft, 1967). Similar provisions appear in the Model Act of the Inter-
national Law Association § 13, supra note 286, at xxiii; the Common Market Draft, Art.
30, supra note 286, at ff 6034; and § 5 of the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement)
Act, of 1933, 23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 13.
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This provision is especially important if, as contemplated by some, the
federal government should conclude bilateral or multilateral treaties on the
recognition and enforcement of judgments based on the Act.328
§ 9. [Short Title].--This Act may be cited as the Uniform
Foreign-Money Judgments Recognition Act.
§ 10. [Repeal].-[The following Acts are repealed: * * *1.
As there are no statutes that would be affected by or superseded by
enactment of the Act, this section should be omitted.
§ 11. [Time of Taking Effect] .- This Act shall take effect ....
Since the prior section would be omitted, this section should be renum-
bered as section 10.
PART IV
General Conclusions
The Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act was not inten-
ded to be a sweeping reform of the common law, but a codification of it, as
it is found in all or most of the states in this country. Although, as the Restate-
ment demonstrates, that law has not always been so clear or consistent as to
permit specific predictions,32 9 it has enunciated general principles, most of
which are found in the Act. Nothing in the Act contradicts any rules found in
the cases, although enactment would surely affect their development. Some of
the provisions have no counterpart in the New York cases, but do reflect
generally accepted rules.
The three current doctrines most likely to feel the impact of legislation
are the non-merger rule, the defense of fraud, and the defense of lack of juris-
diction. The non-merger rule will [probably] be eliminated by the mere fact
of legislation. Since it has always been considered something of an anomaly,
left over from the days of the old pleading practice, there is little reason to
provide for its retention.
330
Fraud, as a defense to recognition of a foreign judgment, has always been
taken to mean extrinsic fraud only..New York, however, now permits its own
judgments to be attacked on the ground of both extrinsic and intrinsic fraud.
Since domestic principles are likely to be applied to foreign judgments (although
not to sister state judgments), failure to specify that only extrinsic fraud is
meant may lead to the interpretation that is now given the CPLR.331
328. Nadelmann, Non-Recognition of American Money Judgments Abroad and What
to Do About It, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 236, 259-60 (1957).
329. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 98, comment f (Proposed Official
Draft, 1967).
330. See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
331. See supra-notes 200-16 and accompanying text.
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The defense of forum non conveniens to a judgment based only on per-
sonal service is, so far as is known, an innovation. No case has been found
using the doctrine in this way. However, it is a logical extension of the current
learning and should be retained.
83 2
The jurisdictional provisions of the Act are rather conservative. But so
are the cases. It is commonplace that while countries are quite generous in ex-
tending their own jurisdictional reach, they are reluctant to recognize all
equivalent extensions by others. 333 However, the Act has the very considerable
advantage of permitting other jurisdictional bases to be honored by an enacting
state. The list it includes represents only the minima as to which there is a
consensus. It omits to mention only one generally accepted basis for juris-
diction: citizenship (or nationality). This has been a rather unpopular ratio-
nale, however, and none of the current treaty drafts includes it.
3 3 4
In the course of this paper, a couple of rather slight, and one rather major,
changes have been suggested: an amended section 2 is offered in the interest
of clarity, a specific reference to an enforcement procedure (should one be-
come available) is suggested in the interest of increased effectiveness, and a
substantive change in the defense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction is urged
in the interest of rationality. The explanation-or justification-for these has
been set forth in the context of the affected section. Whether or not these are
adopted, it is believed that adoption of the Act in New York would be benefi-
cial. New York is perhaps the most important international commercial center
in the country and it follows that a great many cases having international
aspects are litigated here. The winning party is not unlikely to have to resort
to a foreign forum to collect on his judgment. Of course, he has much to gain
in time and money if his New York judgment is recognized without a full
review of the merits, perhaps a lengthy, costly procedure with an outcome by
no means certain. It is true that not all foreign countries will be-or can be-
induced to treat New York judgments as conclusive. But those which require
only reciprocity of treatment can be assured, by the Act, that New York courts
will recognize foreign judgments meeting its specifications. These specifications
are in substantial agreement with those of various multilateral proposals.
Finally, the Act could serve as a fogndation for multilateral or bilateral
treaties on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. It may well
be that "the great difficulties which have to be overcome . . . could best, and
in many cases only, be removed by the conclusion of international conven-
332. See Ginsburg, The Competent Court in Private International Law: Some Ob-
servations on Current Views in the United States, 20 Rutgers L. Rev. 89, 98-100 (1965).
333. "[Tlhe creators of the legal codes or specific laws as well as the judiciary in
many countries were ready enough to confer a wide jurisdiction on their own courts but
showed a deep mistrust of the administration of justice in other countries." Graupner,
supra note 324, at 368.
334. See supra notes 298-306 and accompanying text.
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tions."3 35 This has been the British experience, and that of most civil law
countries.
8 36
If the Act should some day be the foundation for a treaty by the federal
government, then uniformity among the states will be most important. Of
course, such considerations militate strongly against any proposed changes in
the Act. However, it is believed that those which have been suggested are not
very damaging to the cause of uniformity, especially since only six other
states have adopted the Act. The first is believed necessary to avoid ambiguity.
The second is suggested in the hope that it will enhance the Act's effects abroad,
where a very high value is placed on abbreviated enforcement procedures.
The third change only is substantive. It does not attempt to abolish a ques-
tionable rule, but only to make the defense of lack of competence (subject
matter jurisdiction) a matter of the sound discretion of the court in those cases
where lack of competence did not invalidate the judgment at home.
There follows a draft of the Act, incorporating the changes. Omitted mat-
ter is indicated by broken lines; new matter is italicized. The section headings
are removed from their brackets to conform to 'the general aspect of New
York statutes. The original section numbers are retained, but some subsections
have been renumbered for consistency with the current New York arrange-
ments.
THE UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT
§ 1. Definitions
As used in this Act:
(a) "foreign state" means any governmental unit other than the United
States, or any state, district, commonwealth, territory, insular possession thereof,
or the Panama Canal Zone, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or the
Ryukyu Islands;
(b) "foreign judgment" means any judgment of a foreign state grant-
ing or denying recovery of a sum of money, other than a judgment for taxes,
a fine or other penalty, or a judgment for support in matrimonial or family mat-
ters.
§ 2. Applicability
This Act applies to any foreign judgment:
(a) that is final and conclusive and enforceable where rendered even
though an appeal therefrom is pending or it is subject to appeal; and
(b) that is in favor of the defendant on the merits of the cause of action
and is final and conclusive where rendered, even though an appeal therefrom
is pending or it is subject to appeal.
335. Graupner, Some Recent Aspects of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in Western Europe, 12 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 367, 379 (1963).
336. Id. For an analysis of some problems of litigation under conventions currently in
effect, see Weser, Litigation on the Common Market Level, 13 Am. J. Comp. L. 44 (1964).
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§ 3. Recognition and Enforcement
Except as provided in section 4, a foreign judgment meeting the require-
ments of section 2 is conclusive between the parties to the extent that it
grants or denies recovery of a sum of money. The foreign judgment is en-
forceable in the same manner as the judgment of a sister state which is entitled
to full faith and credit.
The enforcement procedure provided by [name of act or citation] is available
to a qualifying foreign judgment.
§ 4. Grounds for non-recognition
(a) A foreign judgment is not conclusive if:
(1) the judgment was rendered under a system which does not pro-
vide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due
process of law;
(2) the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the
defendant; or
(3)_the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
(b) A foreign judgment need not be recognized if:
(1) the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject
matter;
(2) (1) the defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court did not
receive notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend;
(3) (2) the judgment was obtained by fraud;
(4) (3) the [cause of action] [claim for relief] on which the judg-
ment is based is repugnant to the public policy of this state;
(5) (4) the judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive
judgment;
(6) (5) the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agree-
ment between the parties under which the dispute in question was to be settled
otherwise than by proceedings in that court; or
,(7) (6) in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the
foreign court was a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action.
§ 5. Personal Jurisdiction
(a) The foreign judgment shall not be refused recognition for lack of
personal jurisdiction if:
(1) the defendant was served personally in the foreign state;
(2) the defendant voluntarily appeared in the proceedings, other than
for the purpose of protecting property seized or threatened with seizure in the
proceedings or of contesting the jurisdiction of the court over him;
(3) the defendant prior to the commencement of the proceedings had
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agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign court with respect to the
subject matter involved;
(4) the defendant was domiciled in the foreign state when the
proceedings were instituted, or, being a body corporate had its principle place
of business, was incorporated, or had otherwise acquired corporate status, in
the foreign state;
(5) the defendant had a business office in the foreign state and the
proceedings in the foreign court involved a [cause of action] [claim for relief]
arising out of business done by the defendant through that office in the for-
eign state; or
(6) the defendant operated a motor vehicle or airplane in the foreign
state and the proceedings involved a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising
out of such operation.
(b) The courts of this state may recognize other bases of jurisdiction.
§ 6. Stay in Case of Appeal
If the defendant satisfies the court either that an appeal is pending or
that he is entitled and intends to appeal from the foreign judgment, the court
may stay the proceedings until the appeal has been determined or until the
expiration of a period of time sufficent to enable the defendant to prosecute
the appeal.
§ 7. Saving Clause
This Act does not prevent the recognition of a foreign judgment in situ-
ations not covered by this Act.
§ 8. Uniformity of Interpretation
This Act shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make
uniform the law of those states which enact it.
§ 9. Short Title
This Act may be cited as the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recog-
nition Act.
§ 10. Repeal
The following Acts are repealed
(2)
(3)
§ 10. § 11. Time of Taking Effect
This Act shall take effect....

